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Until recently, extremist groups had generally avoided industrial and economic targets. 
But nowadays, terrorists are changing their strategies and tactics by attacking 
petrochemical facilities which represents a threat to the physical security of 
petrochemical facilities. This Thesis proposes a methodology for the identification and 
prioritization of vulnerabilities in petrochemical industry at Jubail city (JIC) in Saudi 
Arabia. Existing methods are mostly based on an adaptation of the minimal-cut-set 
concept. We suggest that for both homogenous and heterogeneous Critical 
Infrastructures (CIs) a systematic scenario-based approach should be adopted.  
We model CIs as interconnected digraphs. Production Minimum Cut Set (PMCS) 
technique is used to find cut sets for the CIs. Six scenarios are tested for both machine 
failure and terrorist attacks.  All elements of CIs are prioritized based on vulnerabilities. 
The prioritization methodology is based on Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT). The 
impact of losing CI services is evaluated using a value tree that reflects the perceptions 
of five decision makers with different background. These results are provided to the 
decision maker for use in risk management. A location-based technique is used to help 
decision maker to calculate the loss due terrorist attacks. The methodology is illustrated 
through the presentation of the analysis conducted on petrochemical industry at JIC. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer and exporter. It holds 25% of the world’s 
proven oil reserves (261 billion barrels) and produces 12.5% of the world’s oil 
production (about 9.0 million barrels a day) [1]. The stability of the global oil market 
depends on both the Kingdom’s capacity to meet current shortages in oil supply and its 
ability to reassure the market that it will continue doing so in the future. Nowadays, the 
Kingdom is focusing on maintaining its ability to meet global oil demand and protect its 
key oil facilities.  
Until recently, extremist groups had generally avoided industrial and economic targets. 
But nowadays, terrorists are changing their strategies and tactics by attacking 
petrochemical facilities and other national assets. This strategy change does not only 
present a threat to the physical security of petrochemical facilities, but it also aims to 
raise concern for the global energy market [1]. In 1988, a terrorist group called “Saudi 
Hezbollah” claimed responsibility for the bombing of Saudi petrochemical facilities *2+. 
Later on, in 2005, Saudi security forces discovered, in Dammam City, more than 60 hand 
grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine guns, RPGs, two barrels full of explosives 
and video equipment. The Saudi Minister of Interior was quoted as saying that the al-
Qaeda cell had planned to attack Saudi oil and gas infrastructures. He added, “There 
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isn’t a place that they could reach that they didn’t think about,” and insisted that al- 
Qaeda’s ultimate goal has been to cripple the global economy *3+. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia is currently facing challenges in dealing with the changing 
nature of terrorist attacks against its petrochemical resources. Oil fields and 
petrochemical plants, however, are large area targets and redundant facilities ensure 
that an attack on one would not cause a serious disruption in the entire production 
system. At any given time, there are approximately 25,000 to 30,000 troops protecting 
the Critical Infrastructures (CIs) in Saudi Arabia [4]. In 2005, the Saudi security budget 
was estimated to be 10 S.R. billion which includes funding several projects and 
initiatives to secure pipelines, oil fields and other energy terminals [4]. 
This thesis provides a study of the vulnerability assessment of petrochemical industries 
in Jubail Industrial City (JIC) in Saudi Arabia. Petrochemical industry is considered as one 
of the critical infrastructure (CI) sectors in many countries. In fact, there is no global 
definition for CI and each country determines its own critical categories independently 
of others. The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) defines CIs 
as those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters [5]. The CI list includes: agriculture and food, water, public 
health, emergency services, defense industrial base, telecommunications, energy, 
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transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, postal and 
shipping. Also, it includes “key assets” which are: national monuments and icons, 
nuclear power plants, dams and government facilities [6].  
CI protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding the identified CIs and services from potential 
harm, including physical or electronic attacks [7]. It is widely agreed that the typical 
steps of CIP are vulnerability assessment, risk assessment and risk management [8]. 
These steps are illustrated in Figure 1.1 [7]. 
 
 
 
Today, CIP gets more importance as a result of recent global events, including 9/11, 7/7 
and the Bali bombings among others. Although CIP has been a global concern since the 
Cold War, It has regained more exposure since the occurrence of the above-mentioned 
incidents [8]. Also, the increased use of the Internet and Communication Technologies 
has amplified the risks to CIs [9]. These technologies have enabled easier data exchange 
and simplified the ability to transmit data, thus lightening the risks posed to the CI’s. 
Figure ‎1-1 Basic Critical Infrastructure Protection Process [7] 
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1.2 Defining the Problem  
Government officials and industry observers agree that petrochemical sectors are a 
preferred target for terrorists. This point of consensus is based on several reasons: 
1. Many of the industry’s facilities are extremely vulnerable to attacks because of 
poor or lacking security. It is commonly believed that even unsophisticated 
strikes on such facilities would have a high probability of success. 
2. Petrochemical sites are located within highly dense residential areas. Therefore, 
successful attacks on these facilities could destroy the lives of several thousand 
people over several regions. 
3. A petrochemical plant attack could have devastating impacts on the local 
economy because many other industries are extremely dependent on the 
petrochemical industry for the supply of their raw materials. 
4. Petrochemical facilities are often clustered together in industrial districts or near 
shipping ports. Therefore, an attack on one of these facilities could trigger a 
reaction chain of explosions at nearby plants and have a disastrous impact on 
trade and economy.  
5. Terrorists may strike petrochemical sites to send a symbolic message. Many 
believe that this rationale was the primary reason behind the thwarted attacks 
on the White House/U.S. Capitol and the successful one on the Pentagon.  
6. Most petrochemical sites have not yet implemented adequate protection 
measures to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks.   
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1.3 Purpose of Research  
In this thesis, we will assess the vulnerability assessment of petrochemical CIs in JIC in 
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to potential attacks. The following issues will be 
addressed:  
1. Suitability of the Network/Critical Node Analysis process to analyze the 
vulnerabilities of the petrochemical sector.  
2. Investigation of the usability of the scenario-based approach, proposed by 
Apostolakis and Lemon [2], in revealing the CIs’ vulnerabilities and allocating the 
available resources based on deployment costs. The scenario will be applied on a 
real case presented by some selected petrochemical plants in JIC (see Figure 1-
2). 
3. Provision of a heightened awareness and an informed guidance to help Saudi 
security forces and concerned stake holders to effectively deal with and contain 
attacks to the CI in the Saudi petrochemical industry. 
4. Extension of the thesis findings and recommendations to other critical sectors in 
Saudi Arabia and provide a platform for such ambitious plans. 
1.4 Rationale behind the Study 
Following the momentum of the security efforts exerted by the Saudi government in the 
wake of the 9/11 events and the observations made on the structure of the 
petrochemical industries located in JIC, the need to conduct effective vulnerability 
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assessments in the protection of the CIs hosted at JIC and other industrial locations 
became even stronger. Moreover, the following obvious facts provide further incentives 
for the intended research: 
 
Figure ‎1-2 Connectivity among petrochemical factories at JIC. 
1. The unequivocal and almost complete dependence of the Saudi economy on the 
petrochemical industry in general and the industries hosted at JIC in particular.  
2. Based on the current configuration of JIC CIs, any threat affecting few critical 
locations in JIC could result in a major interruption/disruption of the provided 
services leading to an adverse economic impact at the global level.  
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3. The open nature and ease of access to JIC CIs make them easy potential targets 
for terrorist threats. These threats may be imminent or with very short prior 
warnings.  
4. The Saudi Government, through its affiliated Security Forces highly values the 
protection of human lives that may be lost as a result of attacks on the CIs that 
are adjacent to densely populated areas. 
5. Incident response and security actions should be observed during incident 
response and crisis management times.  
6. Many private and government entities’ expertise will effectively combat 
terrorism and will respond jointly to occurring incidents.  
7. Because of the multitude of the JIC stake holders, different security measures 
and responses are expected. Therefore, the protection of the critical locations, 
as proposed by our study, should be tightly coordinated between the concerned 
entities.  
1.5 Research Contributions 
Most of the CIs are potential targets and protecting all their components seems to be 
impossible. It is impractical to protect every component of all sectors due to their 
complexity or the latter ones and their interdependencies. Previous reports such as the 
one issued by the National Research Council [11] offer a large number of 
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recommendations to protect these CIs. But implementing all of them would be costly 
and ineffective. 
The petrochemical industry represents the Achilles’ heel of the national economy and 
welfare. There are many aspects to be considered in modeling the CI interdependencies. 
A systematic approach that identifies the significant relevant risks is needed to protect 
CIs from terrorist threats and attacks. Due to the complexity and widespread nature of 
the CIs, their protection is a major technical challenge. There are many practical and 
theoretical challenges to the development of effective methods that are capable of 
modeling and planning for CI threats and coordinating actual and decisive responses to 
combat them. 
Furthermore, in this Thesis, we aim to propose efficient mechanisms to “optimally” 
allocate limited resources to reduce the overall risk threatening the safety of the CIs. 
The deployment of these limited resources is usually quantified through financial cost 
estimation. Therefore, a screening methodology is needed to determine the cost 
distribution of the available resources. The sought screening methodology is expected 
to combine key asset identification with a quantitative analysis to guide the decision 
makers in their cost allocation the protection of the most critical components of the CIs. 
Furthermore, this Thesis discusses a methodology for identifying the critical locations in 
the petrochemical industry. A critical location can be defined as a point where a 
successful attack could lead to devastating consequences. Some critical locations may 
be easily identified but other locations may only be revealed through an analysis of the 
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CIs. This methodology can identify individual critical locations and their combinations, 
which could lead to significant consequences when attacked through simultaneous or 
sequential events. All the critical locations will be ranked according to their potential 
impact which will be used as the basis of risk informed decision making. 
1.6 Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis is outlined as follows. In Chapter 2, an introduction to CIP and its relation to 
network theory are presented.  Also, several CI interdependency models are addressed 
in this chapter. Next, in Chapter 3, risk analysis model are described. Then, a proposed 
methodology based on this model to protect CIs at JIC is presented. Some background 
material on the petrochemical industry at JIC is given in chapter 4. The petrochemical 
industry at JIC is taken as a case study for the proposed model. Six scenarios are studied 
including both machine failure and terrorist attack. The conclusions are summarized in 
Chapter 5, which also includes suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The petrochemical industry uses oil and natural gas as major raw materials to produce 
petrochemical products. Oil and natural gas are composed primarily of hydrocarbons. 
Most petrochemicals contain hydrogen or carbon or both. Petrochemicals can be 
converted into thousands of industrial and consumer products, including plastics, paints, 
rubber, fertilizers, detergents, dyes, textiles and solvents. The industry consists of 
primary and secondary divisions. The former produces basic petrochemicals, such as 
ethylene, from oil or gas. The latter converts these petrochemicals to materials that may 
be directly used by other industries [12]. 
Most of the Gulf Countries Council (GCC) countries have already in place a healthy and 
growing base in chemical production that utilizes methane, ethane and gas liquid 
feedstock in petrochemical units. From 2000 to 2006, the average of GCC investment 
value growth in chemicals and petrochemicals was 5% [13]. Also, workforce in this 
sector reached 163,134 workers in 2006 [13]. By the year 2020, investments in this 
sector are expected to exceed US $120 billion. The petrochemical sector is an important 
growth component of the GCC overall industrial sector [11]. 
The annual business for the U.S. chemical industry is about US $664 billion. It directly 
employs more than 800,000 workers and indirectly about 4,790,000 workers. American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) members have invested nearly US $6 billion to further enhance 
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security at chemical facilities over the last six years [14]. From a security perspective, 
chemical facilities could be converted into weapons of mass destruction. About 600 
facilities could each potentially threaten between 100,000 and a million people and 
about 2,300 facilities could each potentially threaten between 10,000 and 100,000 
people within “vulnerable zones” at these facilities *15+. 
Also, an attack on a petrochemical facility could disrupt economy or impact other CIs. 
The chemical manufacturing industry supplies other industries with key products 
(agriculture, pharmaceuticals, drinking water and food processing) [16]. In general, a 
failure in CI will have a significant impact on other sectors to perform necessary 
functions. 
The majority of experts in the petrochemical industry agree that the chemical facilities 
are attractive targets for terrorists [16]. Also, they believe that current security 
conditions at most petrochemical facilities are insufficient [17]. 
There are several approaches to provide additional security to CIs. The first approach 
argues that the private sector should shoulder the majority of responsibility for 
providing additional security measures to petrochemical facilities. It is believed that 
market forces are sufficient to protect petrochemical facilities from terrorist attacks 
without any external interference. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the 
private sector controls 85% of the petrochemical facilities [17]. In addition, the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC) says more actions are forthcoming and that the trade 
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association will continue to prevent chemical facilities and their products from being 
used to harm anyone [18]. 
On the other hand, there are those who believe that the private sector and the current 
requirements alone are not sufficient to improve the protection of the petrochemical 
facilities from terrorism. The second approach relies heavily on mandates to force plant 
officials to provide tasks’ list for their site protection. They believe that without 
mandates, any added protective measures by the industry will likely be ineffective [19], 
[20]. 
Standing between the two views, there are those who believe that none of these 
approaches will effectively solve the problem. They argue that there is an urging need 
for the creation of partnerships between the private and public sectors and those they 
should work collaboratively with the national security to reduce the attractiveness of 
petrochemical facilities as targets of terrorism. This cooperative solution will yield more 
comprehensive and effective long-term results [21]. 
2.2 The Relationship between Network Theory and CIP 
According to Lewis (2006), CIs sectors are naturally modeled as networks where assets 
are the nodes and the relationships between pairs of assets are links. In this way CIs can 
be understood, analyzed and then protected using Network Theory [6]. Using network 
theory, CIs can be modeled as graphs containing nodes, links and a map that tells which 
nodes are connected to other nodes in the network. Also, it can be used practically to 
model, analyze and harden potential targets in every CI sector. Like power grid, gas, 
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water supply system and petrochemical industries, CIs can be modeled as networks and 
analyzed to identify assets that may be at risk. Based on this, network theory, an area of 
applied mathematics and part of graph theory, is applied as a framework to analyze CIs 
because a network clearly identifies the structures of these CIs. For example, 
petrochemical industry can be modeled as a network of plants (nodes) and pipes (links). 
Applying network theory to CIs allows using several analysis techniques to the modeled 
network to know more about the modeled CI. In this case, several issues could be 
addressed such as “are these two plants connected by critical pipes?”, “does the overall 
production network have single points of failure?” and “are connections between plants 
responsible for the cascading failures?” *6+. 
Networks can be defined as a collection of nodes and links that connect pairs of nodes 
[6]. Modeling CIs as networks have been discussed in several publications like [22], [23]. 
More formally, the study of networks is based on graph theory because networks are 
mathematical graphs [6]. A graph G is an ordered triplet (V(G), E(G),  and G). It consists 
of a nonempty set V(G) of vertices, a set E(G) of edges and an incidence function G that 
associates with each edge of G an unordered pair of vertices of G. If e is an edge and u 
and v are vertices such that a (e) = (u, v), then e is said to join u and v [24]. For 
example, let G = (V(G), E(G), G) where 
V(G) = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6}    (1)  
E(G) = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6}    (2) 
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G(e1) = (v1, v2)   G(e2) = (v2, v3)   G(e3) = (v3, v4) 
G(e4) = (v3, v5)  G(e5) = (v3, v6)  G(e6) = (v5, v6) 
 
Figure ‎2-1 Diagram of graph G 
For any graph G, with v vertices and e edges, there is a corresponding (v × e) matrix 
which is called the incidence matrix of G [25]. The incidence matrix M (G) = [mij], where 
 mij= 0, if vertex i and the edge j are not incident; 
 mij = 1, if edge j either begins or ends at the vertex; and 
 mij =2, if edge j both begins and ends at the vertex i, making edge j a loop.  
The incidence matrix is created to serve as the input table for computer analysis. In this 
this thesis Mathematica software is used as a graph analysis tool. Table 2-1 shows the 
incidence matrix M(G) for the graph G shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Edges 
V
er
ti
ce
s 
 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
v1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
v2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
v3 0 1 1 1 1 0 
v4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
v5 0 0 0 1 0 1 
v6 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Table ‎2-1 Incidence matrix for graph G 
If there is a path between two vertices u and v, then they are “connected”. For example, 
in graph G vertices v1 and v5 are connected along path v1, e1, v2, e2, v3, e4 and v5. An 
edge/vertex is called “a cut edge/vertex, if its removal from the graph results in 
separating the graph into two distinct sections. For example the cut edges for graph G 
are: e1, e2 and e3 and the cut vertices are: v1, v2, v3 and v4.  A cut set S is a set of 
components (edges and vertices) which, if removed from the graph, would result in 
separating the graph into two distinct sections [25]. A cut set is called minimal (MCS) if it 
cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set [25]. 
According to [25], a directed graph D, also called a digraph, is an ordered triplet (V(D), 
A(D), D). It consists of a nonempty set V(D) of vertices, a set A(D) of arcs and an 
incidence function D that associates with each arc of D and ordered pair of vertices of 
D. If a is an arc and u and v are vertices such that D(a) =(u, v) then a is said to join u and 
v where u is the tail of a and v is its head. Arc a allows flow from u to v, but not from v to 
u. For example, let D = (V(D), A(D), D), where 
V(D) = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6}    (3) 
A(D) = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}    (4) 
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D(a1) = (v1, v2)   D(a2) = (v2, v3)   D(a3) = (v3, v4) 
D(a4) = (v3, v5)  D(a5) = (v3, v6)  D(a6) = (v6, v5) 
 
Figure ‎2-2 Digram of digraph D 
Similar to graphs, digraphs have also an incident matrix. The incidence matrix N(H)= [nij], 
where:  
 nij =0, if the vertex i and the arc j are not incident; 
 nij =1, if the head of arc j is incident with vertex i;  
 nij =-1, if the tail of arc j is incident with vertex i; and  
 nij =2, if arc j both begins (tail) and ends (head) at the vertex i, making arc j a 
loop. 
Table 2-1 shows the incidence matrix N (D) of the digraph D.  
Arcs 
V
er
ti
ce
s 
 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 
v1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
v2 1 -1 0 0 0 0 
v3 0 1 -1 -1 -1 0 
v4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
v5 0 0 0 1 0 1 
v6 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Table ‎2-2 Incidence matrix N (D) for digraph D 
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Two nodes u and v are connected if a direct path exists from u and v. In digraph D, 
vertex v1 is connected to vertex v5 along the directed path v1, a1, v2, a2, v3, a4 and v5. 
But, vertex v5 is not connected to vertex v1 because there is not a directed path from 
vertex v5 to vertex v1. The concept of a cut set on graph is the same for digraphs. 
In this thesis, CIs are modeled as a digraph, Vertices represent the plants and arcs 
represent the pipes that connect the plants. In this case, we are interested in identifying 
the events that interrupt the production of these plants. Let the digraph D represent the 
petrochemical industry at JIC as shown in Figure 2-3. 14 vertices (nodes) represent the 
JIC’s plants and 36 arcs represent pipes the connecting these nodes. Table 2-3 shows the 
Incidence matrix of petrochemical industry network at JIC . All the nodes are connected 
to each other via pipes to get their raw material needed for their production. This 
means that some nodes produce some raw material for other nodes (consumers). To 
avoid any disruption in the petrochemical industries at JIC, the cut sets (cut arcs and 
vertices) responsible for such failures must be identified. Although the petrochemical 
industry network is modeled as the digraph shown in Figure 2-3, minimum cut set (MCS) 
technique is not applicable in this situation. We found that heterogeneous networks, 
such as petrochemical networks of interest to this thesis, cannot be analyzed as regular 
digraph. Therefore, a major contribution of this thesis is the development of a MCS 
technique to handle heterogeneous networks. 
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Figure ‎2-3  Diagram for digraph of petrochemical network at JIC 
In regular digraphs, all the links carry the same raw material e.g. water is carried in pipes 
in all water supply networks, signals are transmitted in all computer networks and 
power is flown over the entire power grid network. However in petrochemical networks 
each link is carrying different material. For example, if MCS technique is applied to 
node1 in Figure 2-3 the MCS sets will be {e23, e24} which is not true. Node1 requires 
both gas (e24) and petrol (e23) to work in a proper way. Therefore the MCS set for 
node1 is given by {e23}, {e24}. 
To solve this issue, we propose, in this thesis, a new MCS technique to find the MCS in 
all heterogeneous networks. This technique is called PMCS (Production Minimal Cut Set) 
which will be covered in the next Chapter. In analyzing CI networks (digraphs) for all 
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nodes, one is interested to find all the cut sets which have the greatest impact on the 
network when it is successfully attacked. 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
o
de
 
1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 
Table ‎2-3 Incidence matrix of petrochemical industry network at JIC. 
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2.3 CI Characteristics 
Lewis summarizes the major characteristics of CIs as follows [6]: 
 Vastness: Each sector in the CI is a vast network. It is so large and complex 
network that it is impractical to protect every component of each sector. It is 
wide because it covers a large geographical area. It has also many components 
or it is complex. For example, in the water sector in the U.S., there is the 
Colorado River Basin, which provides hydroelectric power and irrigation for 25 
million people. It spans 250,000 square miles and is shared by seven states and 
local governmental entities, including Mexico and the water rights owned by the 
Native Americans. If protecting a single CI is a daunting task, protecting all the CI 
components of all sectors seems to be impractical if not impossible.  
 Command: The interdependency of government agencies, public and private 
sectors, as well as the regulatory and economic drivers makes the problem of 
“who is in charge” a major barrier to CIP. There is no central point of control in 
most of the CI. For several reasons, most of the CIs are beyond the reach of 
direct governmental control. 
 Information Sharing: The lack of information sharing causes inefficiencies and 
vulnerabilities in the CIP exercise. CIs are under the control of several companies. 
There is a major challenge in simply collecting and correlating information. There 
are technical and organizational reasons that make information sharing difficult. 
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Most of the time, these systems are incompatible or hold their information in 
databases that have different indexes, formats and encodings. This would lead to 
interoperability problems. Interoperability of information systems is a major 
limiting factor preventing information sharing.  Most of the information needed 
to effectively prevent attacks on CIs is highly sensitive. Legal, cultural and 
bureaucratic sensitivity runs high among agencies that need to share 
information. 
 Knowledge: The technology behind various CIs is vast and complex and yet it is 
necessary to understand these underlying technologies before effective 
strategies and policies can be enacted. At this stage, there is insufficient 
information about CIP. The technology of CIP begins with an understanding of 
the technology of individual sectors. This requires an understanding of electrical 
power generation and transmission, the technology of telecommunications, the 
protocols of the Internet, the science/engineering of petrochemicals, etc. The 
inner workings of the intermodal transportation system, banking and finance, 
water and utilities, gas and oil pipelines and so on must be understood before 
strategies and policies can be made. Therefore, comprehension of technologies 
is a prerequisite for making an effective strategy for the protection of the 
nation’s CIs. 
 Inadequate Tools: The study of the vulnerability of CIs is a new area of research 
and, as such, the information about CIs needed to propose general approaches 
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or general solutions is rather scarce. Tools and techniques are needed for 
modeling complex CIs, understanding their interdependencies, analyzing their 
vulnerabilities and finding optimal means of protection. Almost every aspect of 
CIP is lacking in terms of a foundational theory and applied proven tools. 
 Asymmetric Conflict: CIs are particularly vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. 
Asymmetric attacks look for high payoff targets that can be damaged by a small 
force. CI vulnerabilities provide an opportunity for attackers to magnify their 
firepower through asymmetric techniques. CI is an easy target for the attacker 
because most sectors are relatively exposed, vast and with little protection. An 
Internet search engine such as Google can be used by anyone to discover the 
locations of critical components.  Also, small forces can make a major impact 
because the most valuable assets of most sectors are concentrated in a small 
number of critical components or locations. Significant attacks can be mounted 
with little force because they require knowledge more than they do forces. For 
example, most telecommunications assets are housed in a relatively small 
number of buildings. These components can be attacked by a single person. 
 Interdependencies: CI sectors are complex because of their interdependencies. 
Interdependencies are due to human organizational structures as well as 
technical\physical linkages between components of a single sector and those of 
other sectors. 
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Interdependencies within a sector and across multiple sectors complicate the problem 
of inadequate sector-specific knowledge. For example, the power grid is so complex that 
the simplest failure in a single power line can propagate like a contagion through a 
crowded population area [6]. Such scenario occurred in the 2003 blackout [6]. Besides 
the inherent complexity of such sophisticated CIs, every CI sector is connected to, and 
hence interacts with, almost all other CI sectors.  
2.4 Dependency 
Dependency can be defined as a connection between two CIs through which the state of 
one CI influences or is correlated to the state of the other one [26]. Consider an 
individual connection between two CIs such as the electricity (i) used to power a 
telecommunications (j) switch. In this case, the relationship is usually unidirectional; CI 
(j) depends on (i) through the link, but (i) does not depend on (j) through the same link. 
Figure 2-4 illustrates the electric power infrastructure dependencies [26]. 
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Figure ‎2-4 Examples of electric power infrastructure dependencies [26]. 
Electric power infrastructure needs natural gas and petroleum fuels for its generators, 
road and transportation to supply fuel to the generators, water for cooling, banking and 
finance for fuel purchases and telecommunications for monitoring system status and 
system control (i.e., supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and 
energy management systems (EMSs)) [26]. During emergencies or after component 
failures, the electric power infrastructure will have potentially different critical 
dependencies on the same infrastructures. For example, the utility may require 
petroleum fuel for its emergency vehicles and emergency generators and road 
transportation to dispatch repair crews and spare components. As depicted in Figure 2-
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4, electric power is the supported CI and natural gas, oil, transportation, 
telecommunications, water and banking and finance are supporting CIs [26]. 
2.5 Interdependency 
Interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two CIs where the state of each 
CI influences the state of the other [26]. Usually, CIs are connected at multiple points 
through a wide variety of mechanisms such that a bidirectional relationship exists 
between the states of any given pair of CIs; infrastructure (i) depends on (j) through 
some links, and (j) likewise depends on (i) through other links. More generally, two CIs 
are interdependent when each one is dependent on the other. The term 
interdependency means that the connections are established among agents in different 
CIs in a general system of systems [26]. 
 
Figure ‎2-5 Example of CI interdependencies [26]. 
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The interdependent relationship among several CIs is shown in Figure 2-5 [26]. These 
complex relationships are characterized by multiple connections among CIs, feedback 
and feed forward paths, and intricate, branching topologies. It is clearly impossible to 
understand the behavior of a given CI in isolation from other CIs [26].  
There are four types of interdependences: 1) physical interdependency; 2) Cyber 
Interdependency; 3) geographic interdependency; and 4) logical interdependency. 
2.5.1 Physical Interdependency 
Physical interdependency occurs when the state of a CI is dependent on the material 
outputs of another CI [26]. It means that the physical output of one CI is the physical 
input to another CI [27]. For example, a rail network and a coal fired electrical 
generation plant are physically interdependent, given that each supplies commodities 
that the other requires to function properly [26]. The railroad provides coal for fuel and 
delivers large repair and replacement parts to the electrical generator, while electricity 
generated by the plant powers the signals, switches and control centers of the railroad. 
The state of one CI directly influences the state of the other and vice versa. The state 
change in the railroad can drive a corresponding state change in the electrical grid. 
Consequently, the risk of failure in one CI can be a function of risk in a second CI if the 
two are interdependent. 
2.5.2 Cyber Interdependency 
Cyber interdependency occurs when the state of a CI depends on information 
transmitted from another CI [26]. Cyber interdependencies are relatively new and are a 
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result of advanced computerization and networking [27]. Disruptions in one CI may or 
may not cause disruptions in another CI, depending on the nature and magnitude of the 
disruption. The CIs are connected to each other via electronic and informational links. 
The information output of one CI is the information input to the other CI. 
2.5.3 Geographic Interdependency 
Geographical interdependency occurs when CIs are located in one area and an 
environmental event can create state changes in all of them [26]. For example, fire 
could create correlated changes in the geographically interdependent CIs. An electrical 
line and a fiber-optic communications cable slung under a bridge connect 
(geographically) connect elements of the electric power, telecommunications and 
transportation infrastructures. Due to proximity, they are geographically 
interdependent. Traffic across the bridge does not affect the cables but physical damage 
to the bridge could affect the electric power, communications and transportation 
infrastructures [26]. 
2.5.4 Logical Interdependency 
Logical interdependency occurs when the state of two CIs depends on the state of the 
other via a mechanism that is not a physical, cyber or geographic connection [26]. It 
means that the state of one CI depends on the state of another CI. It is usually via 
human decisions and actions. For example, a lower gas price increases the flow of 
gasoline and traffic congestion. In this case, the logical interdependency between the 
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petroleum and transportation infrastructures is due to human decisions and actions 
[27]. 
2.6 CIP Case Studies 
2.6.1 USA 
According to [28], nearly five million Americans live within a five mile radius of the most 
hazardous chemical facilities in the U.S. Before the 9/11 events, there was no single 
agency in the government whose core mission is to protect against and respond to an 
attack on one of these major facilities. There were twelve different government entities 
supervising the protection of USA’s CIs *28+. After 9/11, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was established [29]. CIP efforts were merged within the new 
Department as well as the twenty two relevant federal agencies transferred to the DHS 
including the following [29]: 
 The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) which is an expansion of 
the FBI’s Computer Crime Division into a focal point for national threat 
assessments, vulnerability analysis, investigations and response coordination in 
the information systems and computing sectors. 
 CI Assurance Office (CIAO) which support individual agencies developing plans, 
helps coordinate national education and awareness campaigns and provides 
legislative and public affairs support.  
 The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) which is a 
modeling, simulation and analysis program that prepares and shares analyses of 
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the CIs and the key resources including their interdependencies, vulnerabilities, 
consequences of disruption and other complexities. 
 Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs) which gathers and analyzes 
information on threats and incidents and shares this information with 
Government entities.   
The US DHS Department builds and maintains a comprehensive assessment of the 
infrastructure sectors: food, water, agriculture, health systems and emergency services, 
energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, dams), transportation (air, road, rail and ports), 
information and telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, 
chemical, defense industry, postal and shipping and national monuments and icons.  
The Department develops and harnesses the best modeling, simulation and analytic 
tools to prioritize effort, taking as its foundation the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center (currently part of the Department of Energy) [28].   
DHS relies on a cooperative approach between government agencies and the private 
sector to determine and address vulnerabilities [30]. The American CIP system is 
relatively transparent [31]. 
2.6.2 Canada 
The Government of Canada is working cooperatively with provinces, the private sector 
and the international community to protect CIs. The Federal Government brings greater 
accountability to the CIP at the Federal level. The Minister of Public Safety has 
introduced the Emergency Management Act (EMA), which modernizes the 
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Government’s approach to emergency management and aligns federal roles and 
responsibilities with today’s realities and threat environment [32]. As part of the EMA, 
federal ministers are responsible for identifying risks to CI within their respective areas.  
Also, each department is required to develop emergency plans to address these risks.  
Each department maintains tests and exercises these emergency management plans 
according to the policies and programs established by the Minister of Public Safety.  
Canadians want all levels of government working together to protect their CIs.  Canada’s 
national approach has two parts; first, the National Strategy for CIP which clarifies all 
the concepts relevant to all CI sectors and their challenges [32]. Moving forward with 
this collective approach, the National Strategy will serve as the basis for enhanced 
collaboration between all levels of Government and the private sector. 
The second element of Canada’s national approach is the development of a flexible 
Action Plan (AP) that builds on the National Strategy.  It will be updated on an iterative 
basis to enable partners to anticipate new risks and adopt new best practices [3]. 
The National Strategy for CIP and the supporting AP, in addition to the Emergency 
Management Act, establish a collective approach that can be used to set national 
priorities, goals and requirements for CIP. This collective approach will enable funding 
and resources to be applied in the most effective manner to reduce vulnerabilities, 
mitigate threats and minimize the consequences of attack and disruptions [32]. 
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On March 1, 2004, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the 
Science and Engineering Research Canada (NSERC) start a new academic research 
program to investigate infrastructure interdependencies. The Joint Infrastructure 
Interdependencies Research Program (JIIRP) is part of the national efforts to secure and 
protect Canada's CIs [33]. 
JIIRP produces new science-based knowledge and practices to better assess, manage 
and mitigate risks to Canada from failures in its CIs. This program is designed to help 
infrastructure owners and operators better understand the extent of their 
dependencies on other sectors for delivering their services and goods. It also provides 
process that mitigates the risk resulting from these interdependencies. The goal of the 
JIIRP is to bring together all organizations, with a stake in safeguarding CIs, to develop 
partnerships and methods of information exchange [33].   
Also, the JIIRP program aims to expand academic, industrial and government research 
activities in the area of infrastructure interdependencies; to develop relevant new 
knowledge, techniques and policies. It aims also to raise awareness of infrastructure 
interdependency and build partnerships across Canada and among relevant disciplines 
to facilitate effective transfer and dissemination of research results to the private and 
public sectors [33].   
2.6.3 The United Kingdom 
Although CIP started to be a concern at the highest level at the end of 1990s, the bomb 
attacks in London in July 2005 were a reminder that the threat from terrorism is real 
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and serious. In February 1st, 2007, the Center of Protection of National Infrastructure 
(CPNI) was formed from the merger of the National Infrastructure Security Co-
ordination Centre (NISCC) and a part of MI5 (the UK's Security Service), the National 
Security Advice Centre (NSAC). NISCC provided advice and information on computer 
network defense and other information assurance issues. NSAC provides also advice on 
physical security and personnel security issues. However, CPNI provides integrated 
security advice to the businesses and organizations which make up CIs. Through the 
delivery of this advice, UK protects national security by helping to reduce the 
vulnerability of CIs to terrorism and other threats [34]. 
2.6.4 Australia 
The Australian model is based on consultation and cooperation between the owners 
and operators of CIs and governments. CIP requires the active participation of the 
owners and operators of CIs, regulators, professional bodies and industry associations, 
in cooperation with all levels of government and the public. In April 2003, The Trusted 
Information Sharing Network (TISN) was established [35]. TISN is a forum in which the 
owners and operators of CIs can work together by sharing information on security issues 
which affect their CIs. The network is made up of a number of Infrastructure Assurance 
Advisory Groups (IAAGs) for different business sectors and is overseen by the CI 
Advisory Council (CIAC) [36]. 
The Australian Government’s CIP Modeling and Analysis Program (CIPMA) aims to 
enhance the protection of Australia are CI and improve the resilience of the economy 
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and society *35+. CIPMA shows how different parts of Australia’s CI rely on each other. It 
also shows in detail what would be the consequences if a CI fails.  CIPMA is an invaluable 
aid for decision makers to protect CIP and to counter terrorism.     
2.6.5 Germany 
The CIP (CIP) Working Party of Federal Ministries was set up in Germany in 1997. It 
works under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Many 
campaigns, such as Security on the Internet and the setting up of special commissions 
are intended to increase awareness of the protection of CIs [31]. 
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) works as a coordination function and 
makes security technologies and solutions available [37]. The German system for the 
protection of CIs is not very transparent to outsiders. Since 9/11 events, the work in the 
area of protection of CIs has been growing noticeably. The CI studies carried out by the 
BSI in 2002 make Germany one of the few countries that are following an analytic and 
process-oriented approach [37]. 
2.7 CI Interdependencies Modeling 
The study and analysis of the interdependencies between CIs is relatively new. The 
increase of funding and level of efforts has led to much innovative work in this area. 
Therefore, while modeling of CI interdependencies has begun recently, many modeling 
approaches have been implemented to model interdependent CIs. Each of these models 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. In this Chapter a review of several approaches is 
given. 
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2.7.1 A Screening Methodology for the Identification and Ranking of CIs 
Vulnerabilities due to Terrorism 
Apostolakis and his group at MIT started in 2005 to build a screening methodology for 
the identification and ranking of CIs. Apostolakis and Lemon [10] propose a 
methodology for identifying and prioritizing the vulnerability in CIs. They modeled CIs as 
digraphs and used graph theory to identify vulnerable scenarios which are screened for 
susceptibility to terrorist attacks. Also, all CIs’ elements are prioritized according to their 
vulnerabilities using multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT). Then, a value tree, built based 
on perceptions of the decision-makers, is used to show the impact of losing CI services. 
This method was applied at MIT. Three interconnected CIs, (natural gas, water and 
electricity) were analyzed. It is worth nothing that our methodology, proposed in this 
thesis, applied to both homogeneous and heterogeneous CI networks.   
Michaud and Apostolakis [38] proposed a scenario-based methodology for the ranking 
of the elements of a water-supply network based on feedback from the decision maker. 
This methodology is based on MAUT and a graph theory. They extended the approaches 
proposed by Apostolakis and Lemon [10] by taking into consideration the capacity of the 
CI’s elements and their mean time to repair. This model is applied to water supply 
infrastructure in a midsize city. The water supply infrastructure is modeled as a network. 
Then, scenarios were created to evaluate the result of the failure of each of its 
elements. For each scenario, the supply level to the various users considering the 
capacity of their connection to the available resources is evaluated. Using MAUT the 
disutility of this supply level is evaluated and provided to the decision makers. Two 
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types of failures (random causes and malevolent failures) were considered. Random 
failures which are ranked according to their expected disutility and malevolent acts 
failures are ranked using a subjective combination of the disutilities and the scenario 
susceptibility to attack. The results are provided to the decision makers for evaluation 
and risk management. 
Apostolakis and Patterson [39] presented an approach for ranking geographic regions 
that can affect multiple CIs. This approach shows how the methodology can bring 
attention to areas that are important when several infrastructures are considered. It 
identifies the critical locations by calculating a value for a geographic region that 
represents the combined values to the decision makers of all CIs. A performance index 
(PI) to each CI using MAUT based on their disutility of the loss. Then, importance 
measures (IM) are given to all the elements of each CI using Monte Carlo network 
analysis. IMs and PIs are combined into one value which represents a value worth (VW) 
for each infrastructure’s elements independently. Then, a spatial analysis technique 
within a geographic information system (GIS) is used to combine the VWs of each 
infrastructure elements in a geographic area into a total value called geographic valued 
worth (GVW). All GVW values are displayed in the GIS system in a color scheme. Using 
this map, decision makers can determine whether these regions are critical locations to 
allocate anti-terrorism resources to. This model was successfully applied at MIT. 
Apostolakis et al. [40] proposed a methodology to perform a risk analysis on the bulk 
power system. This method is performed for failures of CI elements due to both random 
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causes and malevolent acts. A power flow simulation mode is used to determine the 
likelihood and extent of power outages when components within the system have 
failures. The result of these failures is determined by looking at the type and number of 
customers affected. Then, the decision makers evaluate the importance of these 
consequences and rank each system component by its risk significance. 
Apostolakis et al. [41] developed a systematic methodology that combines Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA), decision analysis and expert judgment to assess and rank the 
risks from multiple hazards. Scenarios were used to show how initiating events result in 
undesirable consequences. MAUT technique is used to build a value tree. The latter is 
based on the decision-makers preferences about the impacts on CIs and other assets. 
The performance index (PI) enables the ranking of the risks from random failures and 
malicious acts. The MIT Campus was considered for a case study of a real project. 
2.7.2 Inoperability Input-Output Model for Interdependent Infrastructure 
Haimes and Jiang proposed [42] and presented a Leontief-based infrastructure input-
output model to analyze the interdependencies and interconnectedness among CIs. This 
analysis is based on the well known Leontief input-output mode (IOM). The IOM was 
proposed by Wassily Leontief. Leontief-based infrastructure input-output is intended to 
be used as a tool to allocate resources for an effective process of risk assessment and 
risk management. It is considered as a system consisting of n critical complex and 
interconnected infrastructures, with the output being their risk of inoperability that can 
be triggered by one or multiple failures due to complexity, accident, or acts of terrorism. 
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The input to the system is between 0 and 1 where 0 corresponding to a flawless 
operable system state and 1 corresponding to the system being completely inoperable.  
A holistic risk assessment and management framework for modeling the risks of 
terrorism to the homeland security were proposed by Haimes [4]. Both the homeland 
system and the terrorist networks system are addressed here. The centrality of state 
variables of both systems is modeled. A roadmap for modeling risks of terrorism is also 
given here. 
Haimes et al. [44] developed the Inoperability Input-output Model (IIM), based on 
Leontief’s input-output model, for Interdependent CIs [44]. This model characterized 
the interdependencies among sectors in the economy and analyzed their relationship to 
the other sectors. The IIM prioritizes and manages the sectors based on their criticality 
to the economy. An application of their framework to attacks on electric power and 
telecommunications is given. 
Gerald et al. [45] proposed bi-level models to make CIs more resilient to attacks. These 
models consist of an intelligent attacker and a defender along with information 
transparency. These models are Stackelberg games as opposed to two-person or zero-
sum games. For example, one model is used to identify locations for a set of electronic 
sensors that minimize the worst-case time to detection of a chemical, biological, or 
radiological contaminant introduced into the Washington, D.C. subway system. These 
models are illustrated with applications to electric power grids, subways, airports and oil 
pipelines. 
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2.7.3 Agent-Based Model   
In general, the agent-based paradigm has become one of the most popular approaches 
in the software development. Agent-based models are rule-based simulation models. 
Agent-based systems provide a way of conceptualizing sophisticated software 
applications that face problems involving multiple and distributed sources of 
knowledge. In this way, they can be thought of as computational systems composed of 
several agents that interact with one another to solve complex tasks beyond the 
capabilities of an individual agent. The constructed computational agents are used to 
simulate real phenomena and to provide clues into the natural emergence of behaviors 
[46]. AIMS, developed by New Brunswick Critical Infrastructures, and CommAspen, 
developed by Sandia National Laboratories, use such simulations to model CIs as agents 
to study the interactions between them after some disruptive events [47]. 
2.7.4 Cell-Channel Model   
The cell-channel model is one of the modeling approaches for the CI Interdependencies. 
It is used in CI Interdependencies Simulator (I2Sim) which was developed at the 
University of British Columbia [48].  The I2Sim simulate the conditions of each CI 
component for large disaster scenarios to support decision-making to mitigate the 
disaster effects. This model is based on the idea of service token delivery to different CI 
entities. The system consists of cells, channels and tokens. Cells are entities that 
perform functions. Channels are the means through which tokens flow from one 
generator node to a load node.  Tokens are services that are provided by one entity to 
another entity that uses them [48], [49]. 
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The cells’ functionality is determined by the interrelationship between the input(s) and 
output(s) and each channel is described using functions with capacity limitations and 
time delay. The combined cells and channels model makes up the multiple networks 
system. The cell-channel Model has been used on physical layer modeling of 
interdependent CIs [49]. 
2.7.5 Network Models 
A relatively new branch of science has developed in recent years. It describes the 
interconnectivity between network entities, including social, biological and economic 
networks [50]. In [51], network model was used to simulate the spreading of disaster in 
interconnected CIs networks. Also, [52] simulated the effects of node and edge 
"attacks" on a number of networks using the same model.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology Overview 
3.1 Overall Methodology  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was born in the nuclear industry about 30 years ago 
[53], [54], [55] and has traditionally been focused on complex systems such as nuclear 
power facilities and space systems. Its primary concept is to identify the most important 
vulnerabilities by using frequencies and probabilities of component failures. PRA is a 
systematic process which produces an understanding of the associated risks in 
engineered systems. This process combines the probability of an event with the 
anticipated consequences of the event to produce an overall risk of the system. 
According to [56], PRA asks: what can go wrong? what are the consequences? and how 
likely is it? 
Garrick et al. [57] recommended the PRA framework to identify, quantify and manage 
terrorist threats. Apostolakis and Lemon [10] proposed the use of PRA to screen 
terrorism scenarios on CIs. Their methodology, a scenario-based approach, combines 
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and PRA. This approach gives each scenario a 
value that a measure how undesirable is this scenario to the stakeholders. The  value is 
a  function  of  the consequences of  a  scenario  in  terms  of  service  interruption. Then 
the susceptibility of each scenario is measured by calculating the probability of a 
scenario to become true if a threat materializes. This susceptibility is assessed and 
combined with the scenario value to produce a vulnerability assessment. A  scenario  
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can  only  represent  a  critical  vulnerability  if  both  its  value  and  its susceptibility are 
high. 
The first step is to identify the assets whose services must be protected. The assets in 
this thesis will be all the petrochemical plants in JIC. The next step is to identify the 
scenarios that are initiated by malicious acts, could lead to the interruption of these 
services. The existing mathematical network analysis [24], [22] is used to model the 
petrochemical industry CI. The minimal cut sets (MCS) concept [23] is used to identify 
the sets of events e.g. failures that lead to the interruption of the service. In order to 
model the petrochemical CI, we let vertices represent the plants and arcs represent the 
pipes. Then, the MCS (combinations of failures of arcs and vertices) is identified using 
the network model which interrupts the service to each user. The system will be 
considered to have failed if the CI service is interrupted. The MCS determines the 
candidate vulnerabilities of the system. Then, MAUT is used to assign value to each 
determined vulnerability. The assigned value provides additional information to the 
decision maker regarding the degree to which a potential target is accessible [10]. A 
performance index (PI) is calculated for each MCS as shown in Equation (5). The PI index 
is the sum of the weights of individual performance measures (PMs) multiplied by the 
disutility of each item for that particular PM. The PMs represent what is important to 
the decision-maker. 
,ij
K
i
ij dwPI
pm
      (5)   
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Where PIj is the performance index for MCS j, wi is the weight of the performance 
measure i, dij is the disutility of performance measure i for MCS j and Kpm is the number 
of performance measures. The inequality PIj > PIm means that the decision maker 
assesses case j to cause more disutility than case m.  
All MCS are ordered by their PIs which, in turn, indicate which MCS, in the event of a 
successful attack, would lead to the greatest disutility to the decision-maker and which 
MCS should be considered as candidate vulnerabilities based on their value to the 
decision-makers. According to [58], there are six steps to determine the PIs: 
 
Structuring the objectives is necessary to identify the fundamental objectives to the 
decision maker in analyzing the system. A value tree is used to develop the PMs. The 
Value tree is a hierarchal approach which represents the fundamental concerns of the 
Validating the Results
Performing Consistency Checks
Assessing Disutility Functions of Performance Measures
Weighting Objectives and Performance Measures
Determine the Appropriate Performance Measures
Structure the Objectives
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decision-maker [59], [60].  Figure 3-1 shows the proposed value tree for petrochemical 
industry in JIC. 
 
Figure ‎3-1 Proposed Value Tree for Petrochemical Factories at JIC. 
Then performance Measure (PM) is used to measure the magnitude of the impact of 
each scenario.  Impact on health and safety and impact on environment are examples of 
PM. Natural scales is used to measure the impact level directly, such as dollars for an 
economic impact, or lost work days for a safety impact. When natural scales do not 
exist, constructed scales are used. Constructed scales are used to reduce the difficulty of 
assessment for all the PMs and to allow the decision maker to combine multiple metrics 
into a single PM [10]. A constructed scale is divided into a sufficient number of zone 
levels, with a description of the criteria appropriate to that level. Constructed scales will 
be developed for all the PMs. Table 3-1 shows the constructed scale for physical 
property damage. 
 
 
44 
 
Level Description 
3 Catastrophic physical property damage, Greater than SR 10 million 
2 Major physical property damage SR 1 million to SR 10 million 
1 Minor physical property damage Less than SR 1 million. 
0 No physical property damage 
Table ‎3-1: Preliminary Constructed Scale for Physical Property Damage. 
The next step is assigning weights to the objectives and PMs using the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) [61]. It begins with a series of pair-wise comparisons between 
the fundamental objectives with respect to the primary goal. This comparison is based 
on a linguistic scale shown in Table 3-2. 
Importance 
Intensity 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance 
Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective. 
3 
Weak importance of one 
over another 
Experience and judgment slightly favor 
one activity over another. 
5 
Essential or strong 
importance 
Experience and judgment strongly favor 
one activity over another. 
7 
Very strong or 
demonstrated importance 
An activity is favored very strongly over 
another; its dominance demonstrated in 
practice. 
9 Absolute importance 
The evidence favoring one activity over 
another is of the highest possible order 
of affirmation. 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed. 
Table ‎3-2: AHP Comparison Scale [61]. 
The comparison will be made first for the fundamental objectives. Then, the weight of 
the fundamental objectives is passed down the value tree to the objectives below. AHP 
is used to distribute the weights among the objectives [58]. The value tree is completed 
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when all weights have been passed down the tree to the performance measures. The 
weights are converted into a 0 to 1 scale using a linear transformation.  
After establishing the value tree and weights, the disutility functions are assessed with 
the associated performance measures. The disutility function is developed by applying 
AHP to the constructed scale for each performance measure [62]. The pair-wise 
comparisons of the levels are applied to all PMs. Once the value tree is complete, the 
preference consistency should be checked for all the PMs. Then, they are converted into 
a 0 to 1 scale by a linear transformation. The worst case disutility has the value 1 for full 
impact of the PM and the least case disutility has the value 0 for no impact on the PM. 
Table 3-3 shows the constructed scale for physical property damage including the 
disutility weights.  
Level Description disutility 
3 Catastrophic physical property damage, Greater than SR 10 million 1.00 
2 Major physical property damage SR 1 million to SR 10 million 0.27 
1 Minor physical property damage Less than SR 1 million. 0.03 
0 No physical property damage 0.00 
Table ‎3-3: Preliminary Constructed Scale for Physical Property Damage with Wieght. 
3.2 Risk Analysis Model 
In 2002, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) issued the document 
entitled “Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets” which is a 
guide which helps organizations identify weaknesses and which offers them a 
defendable method for selecting cost-effective countermeasures to protect their 
valuable assets [63]. Also, it emphasizes the communication of risks and 
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recommendations to the decision makers to improve the success rate of their 
organization. This guide is used as a risk analysis model for the assessment of CIs at JIC. 
This model is a decision analysis tool which assists the decision makers in evaluating the 
terrorism risk at JIC. This model has five steps: Asset Assessment, Threat Assessment, 
Vulnerability Assessment, Risk Assessment and Identification of Countermeasure 
Options, Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure ‎3-2 Risk Analysis Model [10]. 
3.2.1  Asset Assessment 
This step is the most important step of the risk management process where all 
important assets are identified and prioritized. This step helps the decision makers to 
focus their resources on the most important assets. Some assets are tangible (e.g., 
people, facilities, equipment) while others are not (e.g., information, processes, 
reputation). In general CIs have two values; the value of the infrastructures themselves 
and their value as key assets. All the assets of petrochemical industries are provided in 
the next chapter. 
Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Vulnerability Assessment
Threat Assessment
Asset Assessment
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3.2.2 Threat Assessment 
The threat assessment step is related to the previous step. Threats can be identified by 
knowing the adversaries or events that can affect the previously identified assets. There 
are common types of adversaries such as criminals, hackers, foreign intelligence 
services, terrorists and others. However natural disasters and accidents are treated also 
as threats even though they do not possess intent [10], [63]. 
For this analysis of the petrochemical industry at JIC, we make use of six threat profiles. 
These profiles are chosen to represent possible threats that might face petrochemicals 
industry at JIC. The six scenarios we examine are in Table 3-4. 
Scenario Profile Type Description 
1 
Major 
Threat 
Malevolent  
action 
 Caused by group or an individual with significant capability. 
 Attack one or more plants.  
 Result in damage requiring long term restoration (greater than 1 
month) and causing significant impact on JIC industries. 
2 
Major 
Threat 
Mechanical 
failure 
 Caused due technical failure. 
 One or more plants affected.  
 Result in damage requiring long term restoration (greater than 1 
month) and causing significant impact on JIC industries. 
3 
Moderate 
Threat 
Malevolent  
action 
 Caused by a capable group, or individual. 
 Attack one or more plants.  
 Result in damage requiring short term restoration (less than 1 
month) and causing moderate impact on JIC industries. 
4 
Moderate 
Threat 
Mechanical 
failure 
 Caused due technical failure. 
 One or more plants affected.  
 Result in damage requiring short term restoration (less than 1 
month) and causing moderate impact on JIC industries. 
5 
Minor 
Threat 
Malevolent  
action 
 Caused by group or individual with limited capability. 
 One or more plants affected.  
 Result in minor damage requiring minimal restoration (less than 
one week) and causing minor impact on JIC industries. 
6 
Minor 
Threat 
Mechanical 
failure 
 Caused due technical failure. 
 One or more plants affected.  
 Result in minor damage requiring minimal restoration (less than 
one week) and causing minor impact on JIC industries. 
Table ‎3-4 Threat assessment scinarios for JIC 
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3.2.3  Vulnerability Assessment 
Vulnerability is defined as any weakness in an entity to attack. The Vulnerability 
Assessment reviews the existing situation to understand the weaknesses in CIs. In CIs, 
susceptibilities may appear as lack of security patrols, guards, or security procedures. 
According to [10] susceptibilities can be classified into categories to assist the analyst in 
describing CIs, Table 3-5.  
Level Description 
Extreme Completely open, no controls, no barriers, unlocked 
Very high Unlocked, noncomplex barriers 
High Complex barrier, security patrols, video surveillance 
Moderate Secure area, locked, complex closure 
Low Guarded, secure area, locked, alarmed, complex closure 
Very low Completely secure, inaccessible 
Table ‎3-5 Susceptibility Categories. 
The vulnerability can also be expressed also as a function of the susceptibility to attack 
and the value of the assets. Vulnerability = f(Susceptibility, Value) [63]. [10] proposed 
vulnerability categories as shown in Table 3-6 and described in Table 3-7.  
Susceptibility 
Value 
Extreme High Moderate Low Very low Zero 
Extreme Red Red Orange Yellow Blue Green 
High Red Orange Orange Yellow Blue Green 
Moderate Orange Orange Yellow Blue Blue Green 
Low Yellow Yellow Blue Green Green Green 
Very low  Blue Blue Green Green Green Green 
Zero  Green Green Green Green Green Green 
Table ‎3-6 Vulnerability categories [10]. 
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Vulnerability Description 
Red 
 
This category represents a severe vulnerability in the CI. It is reserved for 
the most critical locations that are highly susceptible to attack. Red 
vulnerabilities are those requiring the most immediate attention. 
Orange 
This category represents the second priority for counterterrorism efforts. 
These locations are generally moderately-to-extremely valuable and 
moderately-to-extremely susceptible. 
Yellow 
This category represents the third priority for counterterrorism efforts. 
These locations are normally less vulnerable because they are either less 
susceptible or less valuable than the terrorist desires.  
Blue This category represents the fourth priority for counterterrorism efforts. 
Green 
 
This is the final category for action. It gathers all locations not included in 
the more severe cases, typically those that are low (and below) on the 
susceptibility scale and low (and below) on the value scale. It is 
recognized that constrained fiscal resources are likely to limit efforts in 
this category, but it should not be ignored. 
Table ‎3-7 Vulnerability Categories Description [10]. 
3.2.4 Identify Susceptibility to Different Threats  
In this Thesis, we define the susceptibility as a threat-dependent variable. We have 
chosen to investigate the susceptibility to two different types of threats: 
 A mechanical failure, corresponding to pipe breaks, plant failures. 
 A malevolent action, such as vandalism or terrorism. 
3.2.4.1 Susceptibility to Mechanical Failure 
We chose to work with a number of raw materials needed by each plant. The more raw 
material is needed the high probability of machine to fail. We classify the plants into six 
categories of susceptibility, as a function of the amount of raw materials needed by 
each plant.  Table 3-8 presents the susceptibility categories taken into consideration for 
all JIC elements. The numbers indicate the category of susceptibility according to Table 
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3-9, ranging from 1 (low susceptibility) to 6 (high susceptibility). The same classification 
has been used for both links and nodes. We consider the input links as part of node 
elements. The susceptibility of each element is further detailed in Table 3-8.  
Number of 
raw material 
Number 
of nodes 
JIC Elements Rank Susceptibility 
1 2 Node 13, Node 14  1 Very Low 
2 7 
Node1, Node2, Node4, Node8, Node 9, 
Node 10, Node11, e11, e23, e12, e24, e14, 
e26, e18, e29, e19, e30, e20, e31, e21, e32 
2 Low 
3 1 Node 6, e6, e16, e27 3 Moderate 
4 3 
Node 3, Node 5, Node 7, e2, e4, e13, e25, 
e3, e5, e15, e35, e8, e17, e38, e36 
4 High 
5 0  5 Very High 
>5 1 Node 12, e1, e7, e9, e10, e22, e33, e34 6 Extreme 
Table ‎3-8 Susceptibility Categories for Mechanical Failures. 
3.2.4.2 Susceptibility to Malevolent Action 
Adapting Apostolakis and Lemon's approach [10], we define and use six qualitative 
levels of susceptibility to malevolent threats. The difficulty was to find a way to quickly 
assess the JIC’s elements. The approach that seemed most sensible to both the author 
and the petrochemical industry was to link the susceptibility with the assets value. For 
example, it stands to reason that high-value assets are more susceptible to attack than 
low-value assets. Therefore the susceptibility was assessed simply by using the values of 
the assets and defining a generic susceptibility value for each of the categories.  
As a result, Table 3-9 presents the susceptibility of JIC’s elements to a "malevolent 
action” threat.  The  numbers  indicate  the  assessed  susceptibility  ranging from  1  
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(low  susceptibility)  to  6  (high  susceptibility).  The same classification has been used 
for both links and nodes. We consider the input links as part of the node value.  
Value in SR 
Million 
Number of 
Nodes 
JIC Elements Rank Susceptibility 
<500 4 
Node4,  Node6, Node10, e6, e14, e16, 
e20, e26, e27, e31 
1 Very Low 
501-1000 2 
Node3, Node5, e2, e3, e4, e5, e13, 
e15, e25, e35 
2 Low 
1001-1500 2 
Node8, Node12, e1, e7, e9, e10, e18, 
e22, e29, e33, e34 
3 Moderate 
1501-2000 3 
Node7, Node11, Node13, Node14, e8, 
e17, e21, e28, e32, e36 
4 High 
2001-2500 1 Node9, e19, e30 5 Very High 
>2500 2 Node1, Node2, e11, e12, e23, e24 6 Extreme 
Table ‎3-9 Susceptibility Categories for Malevolent Actions. 
3.2.5 Risk Assessment 
In this step, all the earlier assessments (asset, threat and vulnerability) are combined 
and evaluated in order to give a complete picture of the risks to the CIs. A prioritized list 
of all vulnerabilities in CIs is produced based on the value of the assets, the specified 
threat and the vulnerability of the CIs. The value tree and constructed scales are used to 
analyze CIs from specific threats. PI and susceptibility are compiled to produce a 
prioritized list for all items in CIs [10]. 
3.2.6 Identification of Countermeasure Options (Risk Management) 
The objective of identifying countermeasure options is to lower the overall risk to CI to 
an acceptable level. According to [6], risk management builds on the risk assessment 
process by finding answers to the following questions:  
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 What can be done and what options are available? 
 What are the trades-off in terms of costs, benefits and risks? 
 What are the impacts of current management decisions on future operations? 
The impact on each assessment for the CI must be reviewed for each countermeasure. 
The risk assessment is repeated to account for the impact of the countermeasure. It is 
important to account for cost of the countermeasure and for any negative contribution 
the countermeasure may have to the overall risk [10]. For example, petrochemical 
plants depend on each other to get the required raw material. The output of plant A is 
an input for plant B. Usually one pipe only provides B with its raw material from A which 
is a single point of failure. To protect plant B, it might be recommended to back up this 
pipe. So that all the costs of providing such pipe must be calculated and taken into 
consideration. The overall cost may include the prior studies cost, implementation cost 
and security cost after implementation. All these cost must be considered 
Risk Assessment is a continuous process to achieve success. It is not a one-off process. 
CIs should be monitored for any changes that could impact the analysis. Asset values 
may change; new threats my fade away and vulnerability may also change. Continuous 
assessment is necessary to timely efficiently and cost effectively address new risks [63]. 
3.3 Location-based Production Loss Calculation (LPLC)  
As we know, decision makers have a big concern about the expected loss resulting from 
terrorist attacks. Due to the nature of petrochemical industries, all plants are clustered 
in one area. We propose a methodology to calculate the loss in each plant within this 
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cluster. This methodology is called Location-based Production Loss Calculation (LPLC) 
which is based on node location. It is based on the distance between nodes and attack 
location. Also, it takes into consideration the direct or indirect connectivity with the 
target node.  
 
Figure ‎3-3 Area Coverage of Targeted Zones 
This methodology divides the plant cluster into five zones as shown in Figure 3-3. The 
first zone covers 5% of the cluster area and starts from the attack location. All nodes in 
this zone will have Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 2160 hours starting from the attack 
time. Also all nodes that connected to the nodes in this zone, belong to cut set nodes, 
will be suspended for the same period. The second zone covers 10% of the cluster area 
and has MTTR 720 hours. All zones are shown in Table 3-10. To test LPLC, three 
scenarios of terrorist attacks are used to test this methodology in the next Chapter. 
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Zone Risk Value MTTR MTTR (H) Explanation 
1 5% Three Months 2160 
Major damages to the plant 
and large reconstruction is 
required 
2 10% One Months 720 
Minor damages to the plant 
and some reconstruction is 
required 
3 30% One Week 168 
Heavy maintenance is required 
and some equipments need 
replacement 
4 50% Three days 72 
Heavy maintenance is required 
and some equipments repair 
5 100% 12 Hours 12 
No damages but light 
Maintenance Required for 
Safety 
Table ‎3-10 LPLC Zones. 
3.4 Proposed Methodology 
The work of Apostolakis and Lemon (2005) is a systematic process to analyze failures in 
an infrastructure and rank them according to their impacts on the stakeholders. The 
work presented in this thesis extends their work and apply their methodology to 
petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia in Jubail Industrial City (JIC) as follows: 
 Apostolakis and Lemon considered a small community (MIT campus) and a small 
number of assets (buildings) that the decision makers wished to protect. This 
thesis considers a city (JIC) and all its petrochemical industry that the decision 
makers care about; 
 A minimal cut set (MCS) approach is used to identify and analyze vulnerabilities 
in the CIs. Apostolakis and Lemon modeled the CIs using networks to take 
advantage of mathematical network analysis for the identification of minimal cut 
sets (MCS) [5]. In the petrochemical industry, the MCS is not the minimum edges 
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that disconnect the network. It goes beyond this and covers any edge(s) whose 
removal interrupts the petrochemicals production cycle;  
 
Figure ‎3-4 Petrochemical factories in JIC. 
 All previous studies covered water-supply networks [38], natural gas network 
[39] and power grids [40]. In this work, we will apply this methodology to the 
petrochemical industry. The links in water, gas and power networks carry one 
material in each system. For example, in water-supply systems the material 
being transported over the network is only water. While in petrochemical 
industry the material that is carried over the network depends on the production 
needs of each plant.  
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 Due to the criticality of the in petrochemical industry, the capacity of the 
elements in the system is not taken into account. The system elements are 
modeled as binary (success–failure) items; 
 Time is taken into account explicitly because the consequences of losing service 
is time-dependent; and 
 The decision makers considered in this work are five decision-makers in the 
petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia. 
 This study analyzes the physical and geographical interdependencies in 
petrochemical plants in JIC. The physical interdependency applied to plants that 
depend on the products of other plants. Any failure or disruption to any source 
plant results in the failure of the receiving plants. The geographical 
interdependency occurs due to the widespread location of petrochemical plants 
at JIC where 14 plants cover approximately 80 km, as shown in Figure 3-4. These 
plants are connected together via a network of pipes which is more than 150 km 
long. For security reasons, these data have been partially modified and do not 
represent the real petrochemical industry in JIC.  
 Due to the nature of petrochemical industries where all plants are clustered in a 
large area, a new methodology is proposed to estimate the loss due terrorist 
attacks. Any attach to this cluster affect all plants either directly or indirectly. 
This methodology calculates the loss based on the plants location within the 
petrochemical cluster. 
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Chapter Four:  Petrochemical Industry at JIC Case Study 
4.1 Background 
After September 11, 2001, the East Coast blackout of August 14, 2003 and the 7 July 
2005 London bombings, CIs protection (CIP) became a world focus. Terrorist acts are 
aimed for maximum social disruption. One subset of the potential targets of terrorist 
acts is the nation's CIs [6]. These CIs include telecommunications, energy, industrial 
plants, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, emergency services at both 
the governmental and private levels. They are complex and interdependent and 
sensitive to disruptions that can lead to cascading failures with serious consequences. 
Complex CIs have critical nodes and any attack on these nodes could lead to a significant 
disruption.  
Computerization and automation used to improve the efficiency of many CIs, have 
resulted in an increase in system complexity, and dependency [65], [66]. According to 
[26] interdependency can be defined as a bidirectional relationship between two CIs 
through which the state of each CI influences the state of the other and vice-versa. Due 
to these technical complexities and a general lack of understanding of interdependent 
relationships among CIs, CI interdependencies are considered to be a weakness and may 
permit vulnerabilities to go unrecognized until a major failure occurs to the CIs.  
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4.2 Petrochemical Industry CI 
The petrochemical industry is considered as one of the major CI in any oil-producing 
country. It uses oil and natural gas as major raw materials to produce chemicals. 
Petrochemicals can be converted into thousands of industrial and consumer products, 
including plastics, paints, rubber, fertilizers, detergents, dyes, textiles and solvents. This 
industry consists of two major divisions. The first one is the primary petrochemical 
industry which produces basic chemicals, such as ethylene, from oil or gas. The second 
one is the secondary industry which converts the basic petrochemicals into materials 
that may be directly used by other industries [67]. 
From a security perspective, chemical facilities could be converted into weapons of 
mass destruction. For example there are about 600 facilities in the US which could each 
potentially threaten between 100,000 and a million people and about 2,300 facilities 
which could each potentially threaten between 10,000 and 100,000 people within these 
facilities’ “vulnerable zones” *68+. Also, the chemical manufacturing industry supplies 
other industries with key products (agriculture, pharmaceuticals, drinking water and 
food processing) [69].In general, a failure in CI will have a significant impact on another 
sector which performs necessary functions. So any attack on a petrochemical facility 
could disrupt the economy or seriously impact other CIs. The majority of experts in the 
chemical industry agree that the chemical facilities are attractive targets for terrorists 
[69]. Also, they believe that current security conditions at most chemical facilities are 
inadequate [70]. 
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Figure ‎4-1: Map of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
4.3 Petrochemical Industry at JIC 
This thesis focuses on the petrochemical industry in Jubail Industrial City (JIC) in Saudi 
Arabia, (Figure 4-1). JIC is considered as the centre for future national economic growth 
by the Saudi Government. It is an international hub for value-added petrochemical 
industry and an increasingly recognized destination for real estate investment.  JIC is 
located in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and its population is about 250,000 
people [71]. It was designated as a new industrial city by the Saudi government, and has 
seen rapid expansion and industrialization since. It is a complex of petrochemical plants, 
iron works and a number of smaller companies, plus a Royal Saudi Naval Base. It is also 
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considered as the Middle East's largest and the world's 5th largest petrochemical 
company, Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) [72]. Also it is home to the world's largest 
seawater desalination plant. It provides 50% of the country's drinking water through 
desalination of the water from the Arabic Gulf. King Fahd Industrial Port, in JIC, is used 
for different import and export needs. In JIC, there are more than 20 factories of 
primary industries and more than 25 factories of secondary industries [71]. 
Figure ‎4-2: Components of Saudi Non-oil Exports [73]. 
Saudi Arabia is considered as a key player in the global petrochemical industry. It 
accounts for 75% of GCC petrochemical production [74]. Figure 4-2 shows that 
petrochemical production accounts for about one half of Saudi non-oil exports [73]. The 
petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia enjoys a natural competitive advantage due to 
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the availability of low cost feedstock on account of the vast crude oil and natural gas 
resources. Estimates are that more than $70 billion of petrochemical projects are 
currently under development in the Kingdom. The Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi 
Aramco) is also forging ahead with its own plans to be a serious player in the 
downstream petrochemical sector. It has entered the industry with a $16 billion Ras 
Tanura project that envisages 1.2 million tons per year ethane/naphtha cracker, 400,000 
tons per year of propylene, 400,000 tons per year of benzene, 460,000 tons per year of 
paraxylene and a polyolefin mix unit. Aramco and Dow are discussing a joint 
development of this project. Work is also under way at full speed on the world’s largest 
integrated $9.8 billion plus Petro-Rabigh complex. This is a joint venture between Saudi 
Aramco and Sumitomo Chemical Company of Japan. The project is expected to come on 
stream by mid-2008. The plant will have the capacity to produce 600,000 tons per year 
of mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) and 200,000 tons per year of propylene oxide (PO) [74], 
[73]. 
4.4 JIC Value Tree and User Performance Index (PI) Assessment 
As it is mentioned earlier, JIC consists of 14 plants to produce different petrochemical 
materials these plants are connected together via 36 pips (links), see Table 4-1. Core 
materials, Gas and Oil, are taken from Node 13 and Node 14. However some factories 
take the output of other factories as input, physical dependency.  
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Plant Product Raw Materials Source 
Node 1 
Methanol Gas Node 14 
Butanediol Butene Node 14 
Node 2 
Poly Propylene Gas Node 13 
 
Propene Node 14 
Node 3 
MTBE Butane Node 14 
Poly Propylene Methynol Node 4 
 
Propylen Node 7 
Node 4 
Menthol Methan Node 14 
MTBE Butane Node 14 
Node 5 
Polyethylene Ethylene Node 7 
Ethylene Glycol Butene Node 7 
 
Oxagen Node 13 
 
IC Node 4 
Node 6 
Ammonia Gas Node 14 
Ethyl hexanol Propylene Node 7 
Node 7 
ethylene Ethylene Dichloride Node 8 
Propylene Sodium Hydroxide Node 8 
Butene Propan Node 14 
 
Methan Node 14 
 
Ethan Node 14 
Node 8 
ethylene Ethan Node 14 
Sodium Hydroxide Benzene Node 14 
Ethylene Dichloride Methan Node 14 
 
Methyanol Node 14 
 
Butane Node 14 
Node 9 fertilizer Methan Node 14 
Node 10 Methanol Gas Node 14 
Node 11 
ethylene Ethan Node 14 
Monoethylene Glycol Methan Node 14 
Node 12 
Ethylene Butene Node 7 
Propylene Iso Bentene Node 3 
Bi-Node 13 Ethylene Node 8 
LLDPE Ethylene Node 7 
LDPE Questic Node 8 
 
Ethan Node 14 
 
Selferic-Acid Node 9 
 
Netrogene Node 13 
Node 13 
   
Node 14 
   
    
Table ‎4-1 Input and Output Quantity for JIC Factories. 
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Our approach is based on a performance index (PI) to determine the priority for each 
item in CI [10]. The item with higher PI has the higher priority. The PI is calculated by 
summing the weight of individual performance measures (PM) multiplied by the utilities 
of each item in CI. The PMs are measures of CI’s objectives. The PI is calculated by this 
equation: 
PIj=  
𝐾𝑝𝑚
𝑖 𝑤iuij    (2) 
Where PIj is the performance index for item j, wi is the weight of PM i, uij is the utility of 
PMi for item j and Kpm is the number of PMs. According to [7], there are six steps to 
determine the PIs:  
 
4.4.1 Step 1: structuring the objectives 
The first step to determine the PIs is the structuring of objectives to be satisfied. Before 
structuring the objectives, we held interviews with 5 decision makers, DM1, DM2, DM3, 
Validating the Results
Performing Consistency Checks
Assessing Disutility Functions of Performance Measures
Weighting Objectives and Performance Measures
Determine the Appropriate Performance Measures
Structure the Objectives
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DM4 and DM5, who have different background in petrochemical industries. In each 
interview we explained to the decision makers the intent and the structure of the 
methodology applied in this research. In order to assist them to structure the objectives, 
a set of fundamental objectives that are applicable in a wide variety of prioritization 
contexts is presented [58]. These objectives are not exhaustive, but intended to guide 
the decision maker in to identify fundamental objectives. The objectives are shown in 
Table 4-2. 
Objective Explanation 
Economic 
Accounts for costs and include economic impact on own 
property and other people's property. 
Health and Safety Accounts for risks to workers and the public 
External 
relationships 
Accounts for damage to relationships with general public, 
customers and workers. 
Environment Accounts for the impact on the environment 
Table ‎4-2 Main objectives proposed for decision makers. 
According to [59], [75], value tree can be used to help in structuring objectives and PMs. 
We showed the decision makers a preliminary value tree and we asked them what they 
do when they prioritize items and what they feel are important considerations. Using 
one interview as a springboard for another, we developed the value tree for JIC as 
shown in Figure 4-3 which is a result of several iterations between us and decision 
makers. There are four broad categories of impacts: health and safety, the company’s 
image, the economic and the environment. The next tier of the tree in Figure 4-3 shows 
the PMs that help to quantify impact categories.  
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Figure ‎4-3 JIC value tree. 
4.4.2 Step 2: determine appropriate performance measures 
Performance Measures (PMs) are used to test the extent to which each objective is 
satisfied. The decision makers identify appropriate PMs for their value tree. Then, they 
have to agree on appropriate measurement instruments. These instruments could be 
natural metrics such as dollars for an economic objective, or constructed scales which 
are linguistic scales separated into different levels of impact and each level has a 
description to each level [58]. 
Due to the limited time for each interview with the decision makers, we used the 
constructed scales in [10] to be primary constructed scales in this work. After that it is 
shown to the decision makers for feedback. After reviewing all the feedbacks, the final 
constructed scales for JIC produced are shown in Table 4-3, Table 4-4, Table 4-5 and 
Table 4-6.  
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 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 A large  share  of the  served population  requires  treatment  
3.00 Hundreds of persons require treatment, dozens of them hospitalization. 
2.00 Dozens of persons require  treatment, some of  them hospitalization  
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 
0.00 No health  impact  
 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 A large share of the served population requires treatment. 
3.00 Hundreds of persons require treatment, dozens of them hospitalization. 
2.00 Dozens of persons require treatment, some of them hospitalization.  
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 
0.00 No health impact. 
Table ‎4-3 Constructed Scales for Safety and Health 
 
Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Responsibility is taken away to Ministry of Interior/political institutions. 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens control over JIC's operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
2.00 
A written report is required by Eastern Region Governor/political institutions to 
explain incidents. 
1.00 Verbal enquiry from Eastern Region Governor. 
0.00 No negative image. 
 
Image with the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media.  
3.00 Repeated appearance in national media appearance in international media.  
2.00 Repeated  publication  in  local media, appearance  in  national  media 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media  
0.00 No  negative  image  with the General Public 
 
Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 
3.00 Numerous  letters  from different  customers 
2.00 Repeated  verbal communications,  few letters 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications  
0.00 No negative  image  
Table ‎4-4 Constructed Scales for Image 
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Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions of Saudi Riyals. 
3.00 Millions of Saudi Riyals. 
2.00 Hundreds of thousands of Saudi Riyals. 
1.00 Dozens of thousands of Saudi Riyals. 
0.00 No economic impact. 
 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions of Saudi Riyals. 
3.00 Millions of Saudi Riyals. 
2.00 Hundreds of thousands of Saudi Riyals. 
1.00 Dozens of thousands of Saudi Riyals. 
0.00 No economic impact. 
Table ‎4-5 Constructed Scales for Economic 
 
Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-term damage  to large, valuable  
ecosystems 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with some animals perishing. Eventually  
reversible 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact. No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.00 No environmental impact. 
Table ‎4-6 Constructed Scales for Environment 
4.4.3 Step 3: weighing objectives and performance measures 
After constructing the value tree and identifying the PMs, we asked five decision 
makers,  DM1, DM2, DM3, DM4 and DM5, to assigns weights to the PMs using the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [75], [61]. It is a decision-making technique developed 
by Thomas L. Saaty in the 1970s [61].  It is a method of breaking down a complex, 
unstructured situation into its components parts; arranging these parts, or judgments 
on the relative importance of each variable; and synthesizing the judgments to 
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determine which variables have the highest priority and should be acted upon to 
influence the outcome of the situation [61]. Since we have already structured the value 
tree in a hierarchical arrangement, decision maker can apply AHP straightforward. First, 
decision maker make pairwise comparisons of the impact categories with respect to the 
overall goal. Then, the decision makers compare the next lowest level of objectives to 
the objective above it. This is repeated until the PMs get their weights. 
For example, there are two PMs for the impact category Health and Safety: the number 
of worker suffering health effects and the number of external people suffering health 
damage that may be caused by the terrorist attack.  
To start the weighing process, we asked the decision makers compare one objective to 
another objective with respect to the overall goal. For example, looking at Figure 4-4, 
DM1 compared the economic to the image with respect to the overall goal of terrorist 
event impact. In this case, DM believed that economic is strongly important than image 
(as indicated by the fact that he circled economic and wrote 7 in the space provided). 
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Figure ‎4-4 Example of DM1’s relative importance assessment 
 
As a result of this comparison, a seven appears in row 4 column 3 of the matrix of DM’s 
comparisons shown in Table 4-9. Furthermore, 0.1429, or the reciprocal of 7 is shown in 
row 3 column 4 of the matrix of comparisons. The remainder of the entries of the matrix 
of comparisons was populated in a similar way. 
Figure 4-5 shows the relative weights of DM1 for the impact categories and the PMs. 
Clearly, the DM1 value Health and Safety (weight: 0.6021) much higher than the 
remaining three categories (weights: 0.0360, 0.2037 and 0.1582). These weights were 
elicited by DM1 using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [61]. 
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Figure ‎4-5 Constructed weight of the value tree for DM1. 
Table 4-7 shows the initial constructed weight of the value tree for the five decision 
makers.  
 
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 
Impact 
Category 
Local 
Weight 
Global 
Weight 
Local 
Weight 
Global 
Weight 
Local 
Weight 
Global 
Weight 
Local 
Weight 
Global 
Weight 
Local 
Weight 
Global 
Weight 
Health and 
Safety 
0.4291 0.4291 0.0534 0.0534 0.0580 0.0580 0.1057 0.1057 0.5143 0.5143 
Workers 0.8750 0.3754 0.8000 0.0427 0.8750 0.0508 0.8750 0.0925 0.8333 0.4286 
Public 0.1250 0.0536 0.2000 0.0107 0.1250 0.0073 0.1250 0.0132 0.1667 0.0857 
Image 0.0501 0.0501 0.1750 0.1750 0.0940 0.0940 0.2162 0.2162 0.1158 0.1158 
Internal 0.5364 0.0269 0.0675 0.0118 0.4353 0.0409 0.1580 0.0342 0.2157 0.0250 
General 0.0800 0.0040 0.1463 0.0256 0.0782 0.0074 0.7311 0.1581 0.0612 0.0071 
Customers 0.3836 0.0192 0.7861 0.1376 0.4866 0.0458 0.1109 0.0240 0.7231 0.0838 
Economic 0.3184 0.3184 0.6667 0.6667 0.4396 0.4396 0.0547 0.0547 0.3045 0.3045 
Owned 
Property 
0.7500 0.2388 0.1111 0.0741 0.5000 0.2198 0.8750 0.0478 0.1250 0.0381 
External 
Property 
0.2500 0.0796 0.8889 0.5926 0.5000 0.2198 0.1250 0.0068 0.8750 0.2664 
Environment 0.2024 0.2024 0.1049 0.1049 0.4083 0.4083 0.6234 0.6234 0.0654 0.0654 
Table ‎4-7 Initial constructed weight of the value tree for the five decision makers. 
After the decision makers completed their initial assessments, their results are tested 
using the consistency index and the consistency checks in AHP. These inconsistencies 
may happen because of many reasons e.g. the pairwise comparisons elicit redundant 
information. Table 4-8 shows the initial matrix of comparisons for DM1. After identifying 
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inconsistencies we asked the decision makers to reassess their preferences. After 
attaining satisfactory consistency, the decision makers approved the final weights.  
 Health and Safety Image Economics Environment 
Health and Safety 1 9 7 5 
Image 0.1111 1.00 0.1429 0.1111 
Economics 0.1429 7 1 3 
Environment 0.2000 9 0.3333 1 
Weights 0.6021 0.0360 0.2037 0.1582 
Table ‎4-8 DM1’s initial matrix of comparisons. 
After the entire matrix of comparisons was populated, we computed the consistency 
index for DM’s initial comparison. In DM1’s case the consistency index was 0.326 which 
is not as consistent as we would usually like, it is acceptable Saaty [61]. After revising for 
consistency the weights shown in Table 4-9 were produced. The original weights were 
0.6021 for safety, 0.036 for image, 0.2037 for economic and 0.1582 for Environment. 
We showed DM1 his initial weights and the revised weights and he accepted those 
results.  
Rank Impact Category Weight 
1 Health and Safety 0.4291 
2 Economic 0.3184 
3 Environment 0.2024 
4 Image 0.0501 
Table ‎4-9 DM1’s ranking of objectives and weights 
Table 4-10, Table 4-11, Table 4-12 and Table 4-13 show the final objective weight 
ranking table for DM2, DM3, DM4 and DM5. All theses tables are passed through the 
same procedure that we have done for DM1 table. We can notice that each decision 
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maker has different ranking. DM1 and DM5 have health and safety at rank 1 while DM2 
and DM3 rank it 4. These differences are related to the background of the decision 
makers and their ways for prioritizing these objectives. This diversity assists this 
research to cover different decision makers’ attitudes.   
Rank Impact Category Weight 
1 Economic 0.6667 
2 Image 0.1750 
3 Environment 0.1049 
4 Health and Safety 0.0534 
Table ‎4-10 DM2’s ranking of objectives and weights. 
Rank Impact Category Weight 
1 Economic 0.4396 
2 Environment 0.4083 
3 Image 0.0940 
4 Health and Safety 0.0580 
Table ‎4-11 DM3’s ranking of objectives and weights. 
Rank Impact Category Weight 
1 Environment 0.6234 
2 Image 0.2162 
3 Health and Safety 0.1057 
4 Economic 0.0547 
Table ‎4-12 DM4’s ranking of objectives and weights. 
Rank Impact Category Weight 
1 Health and Safety 0.5143 
3 Economic 0.3045 
2 Image 0.1158 
4 Environment 0.0654 
Table ‎4-13 DM5’s ranking of objectives and weights. 
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4.4.4 Step 4: assessing utility functions of PMs 
After structuring the value tree, determining the PMs and assigning weights to those 
PMs, the decision maker assesses their utility functions. Once complete, the decision 
maker will have all of the information needed to calculate a performance index for each 
JIC item. To assess the utility function for PMs, we use use AHP again because the 
decision maker is already familiar with this technique. It is nearly identical to the 
weighting of objectives and PMs. The decision maker performs pairwise comparisons for 
each constructed scale between the different levels of the constructed scale with 
respect to the objective above the PM on the value tree. Then these comparisons are 
converted into weights where each level will have a weight assigned to it. After that all 
weight are revised for consistency as what we did in previous section.  
As we mention earlier in step 2 regarding to the limited number of interviews with the 
decision makers the utility value for constructed scales are unified to be used for all the 
decision makers. Also, a primary utility values are shown to the decision makers to have 
feedbacks. The final utility values are approved after several iterations. Table 4-14, Table 
4-15, Table 4-16 and Table 4-17 show the utility values for all constructed scales. 
 
Workers  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 A large share of the served population requires treatment. 1 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, dozens of them 
hospitalization. 
0.4499 
2.00 Dozens of persons require  treatment, some of  them hospitalization  0.1881 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 
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0.00 No health  impact  0 
 
Public  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 A large  share  of the  served population  requires  treatment  1 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, dozens of them 
hospitalization. 
0.4499 
2.00 Dozens of persons require  treatment, some of  them hospitalization  0.1881 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 
0.00 No health  impact  0 
Table ‎4-14 Constructed Scales for Safety and Health with Utility Value. 
 
Internal Image  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry of Interior/political 
instances 
1.00 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens control over JIC's operation 
and requires frequent reports. 
0.45 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern Region Governor/political  
instances  to explain  incidents  
0.13 
1.00 Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region Governor  0.04 
0.00 No negative  image  0.00 
 
Image  with  the General Public  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 International interest from the media.  1 
3.00 
Repeated appearance in the national media appearance in the 
international media.  
0.4092 
2.00 
Repeated  publication in the local media, appearance in the national  
media 
0.1363 
1.00 Single appearance in the local media  0.0374 
0.00 No negative image with the General Public 0 
 
Image with Customers  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1 
3.00 Numerous  letters from different  customers 0.3905 
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2.00 Repeated  verbal communications,  few letters 0.1658 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications  0.0573 
0.00 No negative  image  0 
Table ‎4-15 Constructed Scales for Image with Utility Value. 
 
Economic  Impact on Own  Property  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 
0.00 No  economic  impact  0.00 
 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's Property  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 
0.00 No  economic  impact  0 
Table ‎4-16 Constructed Scales for Economic with Utility Value. 
 
Impact on  the Environment  
Level Constructed Scale Utility 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-term damage  to large,  
valuable  ecosystems 
1 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with some animals perishing.  
Eventually  reversible 
0.2842 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  No permanent  damage  to  
any ecosystems 
0.0686 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0 
Table ‎4-17 Constructed Scales for Environment with Utility Value. 
76 
 
4.4.5 Step 5: performing consistency checks 
In order to ensure that the weights are correct, we must perform consistency checks for 
all constructed scales [58], [75]. A consistency check compares the absolute contribution 
from a performance measure to the contribution from the other performance 
measures. When making these comparisons, it is often useful to compare the maximum 
values of the performance measures to each other. 
For example, compare the DM’s preferences between own property damage and impact 
on the environment. The contribution to the overall assessment from each PM is the 
product of the weights of the PM and the disutility from the constructed scale. 
Comparing major physical property damage with a minor environmental impact reveals 
the contribution from each PM to the overall goal to be equal: 
For DM1: 
PI (own property damage) = weight (0.2388) * disutility (0.3697) = 0.0883 
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.2024) *disutility (0.0686) = 0.0139 
For DM2: 
PI (own property damage) = weight (0.0741) * disutility (0.3697) = 0.0274 
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.1049) *disutility (0.0686) = 0.0072 
For DM3: 
PI (own property damage) = weight (0.2198) * disutility (0.3697) = 0.0813 
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.4083) *disutility (0.0686) = 0.2800 
For DM4: 
PI (own property damage) = weight (0.0478) * disutility (0.3697) = 0.0177 
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.6234) *disutility (0.0686) = 0.0428 
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For DM5: 
PI (own property damage) = weight (0.0381) * disutility (0.3697) = 0.0141 
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.0654) *disutility (0.0686) = 0.0045 
These results show that DM1, DM2, DM4 and DM5 agreed on major impact on own 
property has higher priority than minor impact on environment. While DM3 result 
shows minor impact on environment has high priority than major impact own property. 
These results are shown to all decision makers to let them adjust the value tree weights 
and constructed scales disutility values until consistency is satisfied. 
4.5 Network Analysis 
Apostolakis and Lemon in [10] applied the MCS technique which is based on graph 
theory to find all the minimum cut set. In this thesis we found that MCS technique is 
applicable only in homogenous networks such as water supply network and power grid 
networks. However it is not applicable for heterogeneous networks such as 
petrochemical industry network. To solve this issue, we proposed a new technique to 
find the minimum cut set for both types of networks, homogenous and heterogeneous. 
This technique is called Production Minimum Cut Set (PMCS). It has two parts: PMCS for 
nodes which find the set of nodes that are affected by node removal and PMCS for links 
which find the set of nodes that we affected by link removal. 
4.5.1 Production Minimum Cut Set (PMCS) for Node 
Every node belong to a digraph network has input and\or output links. Let’s call the 
input links “Requirements”. These Requirements sets are known for each node. The 
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algorithm for this technique starts by deleting one node at a time from the network and 
delete all the output links of this node. Then, we compare the Requirements set for each 
nodes with its input. The comparison here is based on type not based on the number of 
links. For example, if Requirement set for a node is {gas, petrol, oxygen} and input set is 
{gas, petrol, gas, oxygen}, that means the node is connected. But if Requirement set for 
a node is less than the input set that means the node is disconnected. For example, if 
Requirement set {gas, petrol, oxygen} and input set is {gas, gas, oxygen}, that means the 
node is disconnected. For each node we make a list where this node is part of the cut 
set of this list of nodes. Figure 4-6 shows chart of this technique. 
 
Figure ‎4-6 PMCS Algorithm for Nodes. 
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4.5.2 Production Minimum Cut Set (PMCS) for Link 
This is part is similar to the node technique but in each loop we are deleting one link at a 
time. Each link will have a set of nodes that it affected by its removal. This links is 
considered as a member of the cut set of each effected node. Figure 4-7 shows the 
algorithm used in PMCS. 
 
Figure ‎4-7 PMCS Algorithm for Link. 
 
Production Minimum Cut Set (PMCS) of petrochemical industry network at JIC as the 
follow: 
PMCS (Node1) = {Node 1, Node 13, Node 14, e11, e23}; 
PMCS (Node2) = {Node 2, Node 13, Node 14, e12, e24}; 
PMCS (Node3) = {Node 3, Node 4, Node 7, Node 8, , Node 13, Node 14, e2, e4, e8, e13, 
e14, e17, e18, e25, e26, e28, e29 ,36}; 
PMCS (Node4) = {Node4, Node 13, Node 14, e14, e26}; 
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PMCS (Node5) = {Node 4, Node 5, Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14, e3, e5, e8, e14, 
e15, e17, e18, e26, e28, e29, e35, e36}; 
PMCS (Node6) = {Node 6, Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14, e6, e8, e16, e17, e18, e27, 
e28, e29, e36}; 
PMCS (Node7) = {Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14e, 8, e17, e18, e28, e29, e36}; 
PMCS (Node8) = {Node8, Node 13, Node 14, e18, e29}; 
PMCS (Node9) = {Node9, Node 13, Node 14, e19, e30};  
PMCS (Node10) = {Node10, Node 13, Node 14, e20, e31}; 
PMCS (Node11) = {Node11, Node 13, Node 14e, 21, e32} 
PMCS (Node12)= {Node 3, Node 4, Node 7, Node 8, Node 9, Node 12, Node 13, Node 14, 
e1, e2, e4, e8, e10, e13, e14, e17, e18, e19, e22, e25, e26, e28, e29, e30 e33, e34, e36} 
PMCS (Node 13)= {Node 13}; 
PMCS (Node 14) = {Node 14}. 
4.5.2.1 Scenarios types 
As it is mentioned earlier, we are going to test JIC element based on six scenarios. The 
first three are terrorist attacks scenarios while the others are machine failures scenarios. 
4.5.2.1.1 Terrorist attack scenarios 
Table 4-18 shows the details of the terrorist attack scenarios. These types of scenarios 
are combine both location of nodes and the effected node based on the PMCS cut sets.  
Scenario Type Target Node Effected Node 
1 Major Node 8 and Node 5 
Node3, Node5, Node6, Node7, Node8, 
Node12 
2 Moderate Node 10 and Node 1 Node1, Node10 
3 Minor Node 7 and Node 12 Node3,Node5,Node6,Node7,Node12 
Table ‎4-18 Terrorist attack scenarios. 
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Any attack will affect its neighborhood nodes and its connected nodes. Figure 4-8, 
Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10 shows these scenarios. 
 
Figure ‎4-8 Scenario 1 location. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-9 Scenario 2 location. 
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Figure ‎4-10 Scenario 3 location. 
4.5.2.1.2 Machine failure scenarios 
Table 4-20 shows the details of the machine failure scenarios. These types of scenarios 
might happen to node and\or links. Also, the affected nodes are considers based on the 
PMCS cut sets.  
Scenario Type Target Node Effected Node 
1 Minor e17 Node3, Node5, Node6, Node7, Node12 
2 Moderate Node 4 and e2 Node3, Node4, Node5, Node 12 
3 Major Node 3 and Node 9 Node3, Node9, Node12 
Table ‎4-19 Machine failure scenarios 
Figure 4-11, Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13 show these scenarios. 
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Figure ‎4-11 Machine failure, scenario 1, location. 
 
Figure ‎4-12 Machine failure, scenario 2, location. 
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Figure ‎4-13 Machine failure, scenario 3, location. 
4.6 Performance Index (PI) calculation for PMCS for machine failure 
and terrorist attack scenarios 
After completing the framework for the analysis of the infrastructures, we proceed to 
evaluate the PI for each node at JIC. The constructed scales are used to determine the 
level representative of the damage and impact. For example, looking at the constructed 
scale for economic impact on own property, Table 4-16, for node 3, we classified the 
impact from the the machine failure in scenario 1 as Level 2, hundreds of thousands of 
Saudi Riyals. Therefore, if there is a machine failure at node 3, the contribution to the PI 
for node 3, from the interruption of economic impact on own property would be the 
global weight of the PM (0.2388) multiplied by the assessed disutility (0.1311), which is 
0.0313. 
The remaining constructed scales are used to determine the contribution from the other 
PMs to the PI for node 3. When the summation across all the PMs is completed, the 
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resulting PI for node 3 in the scenario 1 machine failure is 0.0425. Once the assessment 
was completed for node 3, we analyzed the other nodes by following the same process. 
This process will be applied for all the scenarios in both machine failure and terrorist 
attacks. Once the PI is calculated for each node at JIC, the PI of each PMCS is calculated 
[10] as follows: 
𝑃𝐼𝑘 =  𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑠 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑘
𝑖
𝑖       (6) 
Where:  
 PIk is the performance index for PMCS k;  
 PMCSik
 is a Boolean operator equal to unity when the PMCS k impacts the node i, 
and zero otherwise;  
 PIi is the performance index for node i at JIC; 
 i is the node at JIC (1–14);  
For example, PMCS (node 3) impacts service to node 3 and node 12. The Boolean 
operator, PMCSik for k representing the PMCS (node 3), equals unity when i equals 1 for 
node 3 and node 12, and zero in the remaining 12 nodes. The PIk equals the PI for node 
3 (0.0425) plus the PI for node 12 (0.0425), which is 0.085023. This process is repeated 
for every PMCS using Microsoft Excel. All the PIs for all PMCS in both machine failure 
scenarios and terrorist attack scenarios are shown in Appendix E. 
After establishing the PI value of each PMCS, we start ranking them based on their PIs. 
The high PI is the more critical element at JIC. Table 4-20 shows PMCS ranked according 
to their PIs. The highest IP have extreme value where lower IP has very low value. These 
values are combined with susceptibility to determine the final vulnerability category 
(Table 3-6).  
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PI PMCS Value 
0.4341 Node13 
Extreme 
0.3692 
Node7, Node8, Node14, e8, e17, 
e18, e28, e29, e36, 
0.1275 Node4, e14, e26, Very High 
0.108 Node6, e6, e16, e27, High 
0.085 Node3, e2, e4, e13, e25, Moderate 
0.0425 
Node9, Node12, e1, e3, e5, e10, 
e15, e19, e22, e30, e33, e34, e35, 
Low 
0 
Node1, Node2, Node5, Node10, 
Node11, e7, e9,0 e11, e12, e20, e21, 
e23, e24, e31, e32, 
Very Low 
Table ‎4-20 PMCS raked acoording to thier values for scenario of in machine failure. 
4.7 Results and Analysis 
Section 3.2.4 provides guidance regarding the assessment of susceptibility. The final 
step is to develop the vulnerability list. This process is involves an evaluation of the 
impact of each PMCS and assessing the susceptibility of its elements to machine failure 
or terrorist attacks. For example, looking at a PMCS with a relatively high PI, node 13 
(Table 4-20), we find that it provide all JIC plants with gas. Failure of this node would 
result in disruption to all JIC plants. Since node 13 has one raw material, air, it has low 
probability to have a failure. As a result, we classified the susceptibility of node 13 as 
very low. We therefore place node 13 in the blue vulnerability category, (Table 3-6).  We 
applied this process on the value tree of each decision maker for the six scenarios for 
both machine failures and terrorist attacks. After that, we aggregate vulnerability 
categorizations for all elements at JIC for each scenario as shown in Figure 4-14, Figure 
4-15, Figure 4-16 and Figure 4-17. 
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Figure ‎4-14 Vulnerability of Machine Failure Scenarios for Nodes at JIC. 
 
Figure ‎4-15 Vulnerability of Machine Failure Scenarios for Links at JIC. 
 
Figure ‎4-16 Vulnerability of Terrorist Attack Scenarios for Nodes at JIC 
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Figure ‎4-17 Vulnerability of Terrorist Attack Scenarios for Links at JIC 
The previous results show the criticality for all elements at JIC. A graphical 
representation of the vulnerabilities of JIC elements to both machine failure and 
terrorist attack are shown in Figure 4-18 and Figure 4-19.  
 
Figure ‎4-18 Graphical representation of the vulnerabilities of JIC to mechanical failure. 
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It is clear that several nodes are extreme critical in both type of scenarios. Node 13 and 
14 are the most critical nodes because they are the oil and gas provider for all JIC plants. 
Also node 4, 7 and 8 are critical due to physical interdependencies of all other plants at 
JIC on their output. However links e8, e14, e17, e26, e28, e29 and e36 represent the 
most critical pipes at JIC. On the other hand, the criticality for node 1, 2, 6 and 11 are 
very low because they are edge nodes. Providing this result to the decision makers will 
help them to reduce the overall risk.  
 
Figure ‎4-19 Graphical representation of the vulnerabilities of JIC to terrorist attack. 
4.8 Application of LPLC to Terrorist Attacks 
Providing the decision makers only critical nodes and links could do not help them to 
realize how critical these elements. As it mentioned in section 3.3, we proposed an 
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approach to evaluate the nodes’ criticality based on cost of loss. This approach is based 
on the location of nodes and how far it is from the attack. It takes into account the 
PMCS where node might located at zone 5 but it affected by a node located at zone 2 
due to physical interdependence, part if PMCS. Figure 4-20, Figure 4-21 and Figure 4-22 
show three terrorist attack scenarios where LPCL zones are applied. A MTTR is 
calculated for each node based on its location within LPCL zones.   
 
Figure ‎4-20 Scenario 1 with LPLC zones. 
 
Figure ‎4-21 Scenario 2 with LPLC zones. 
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Figure ‎4-22 Scenario 3 with LPLC zones. 
The cost of production is calculated as the final product of each plant. Prices of 
petrochemical in April 2009 are used to calculate the loss of each plant, (see Appendix 
F). Table 4-21, Table 4-22 and Table 4-23 show the loss for each node based on its 
location due to three terrorist attacks. In Table 4-21, node 8 is located in zone 2 so that 
its MTTR is 720 hours. Node 3, 5, 6, 7 and 12 are located in zone 3 and 4 but they have 
MTTR, 720 hours, equal to the MTTR of node 8. This is because node 8 is a cut set, 
physical dependence, for all these nodes and any interruption at node 8 will affect 
them. 
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Node 
Name 
Zone 
Risk 
Value 
MTTR (h) 
Affected 
Nodes 
Product Ton\hour 
Price 
(SAR) 
Loss in SAR Total Loss in Riyals 
Node 8 2 10% 
720 
3, 5, 6, 7, 
12 
Ethylene 114 2663 218,857,500 
253,998,000 720 Sodium Hydroxide 11 1500 12,330,000 
720 Ethylene Dichloride 23 1388 22,810,500 
Node 5 3 30% 
720 
- 
Polyethylene 86 4275 263,553,750 
510,153,750 
720 Ethylene Glycol 171 2000 246,600,000 
Node 3 4 50% 
720 
12 
MTBE 73 2250 118,327,500 
645,435,000 
720 Polypropylene 171 4275 527,107,500 
Node 6 4 50% 
720 
- 
Ammonia 53 1013 38,272,500 
188,775,000 
720 Ethyl hexanol 20 4275 60,277,500 
720 Urea 79 1050 59,850,000 
720 
Di-Octyl 
Phthalate(DOP) 
6 6750 
30,375,000 
Node 7 4 50% 
720 
3, 5, 6, 7 
ethylene 228 2663 437,635,125 
1,162,966,125 720 Propylene 114 3225 265,095,000 
720 Butene 228 2800 460,236,000 
Node 
12 
4 50% 
720 
- 
ethylene 80 2663 153,200,250 
212,396,400 
720 Propylene 9 3225 19,833,750 
720 LLDPE 103 420 31,071,600 
720 LDPE 27 420 8,290,800 
Node 4 3 
30% 168 
3, 5 
Menthol 109 863 15,860,513 
58,369,763 
30% 168 MTBE 112 2250 42,509,250 
Node 9 4 50% 72 12 fertilizer 542 900 35,100,000 35,100,000 
Node 1 5 100% 
12 
- 
Methanol 114 863 1,181,625 
1,681,313 
12 Butanediol 9 4875 499,688 
Node 2 5 100% 12 - Polypropylene 51 4275 2,635,538 2,635,538 
Node 
10 
5 100% 12 - Methanol 375 
863 3,881,250 
3,881,250 
Node 
11 
5 100% 
12 
- 
ethylene 154 2663 4,924,294 
8,211,294 12 Monoethylene Glycol 66 2000 1,575,000 
12 Diethylene Glycol 71 2000 1,712,000 
        
 
3,083,603,431 
Table ‎4-21  Loss calculation due to scenario 1. 
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Node 
Name 
Zone Risk Value MTTR 
Affected 
Nodes 
Product Ton\Hour Price Loss in SAR Total Loss in Riyals 
Node 1 3 30% 
168 
- 
Methanol 114 863 16,542,750 
23,538,375 
168 Butanediol 9 4875 6,995,625 
Node 
10 
3 30% 168 - Methanol 375 863 54,337,500 54,337,500 
Node 2 4 50% 72 - Polypropylene 51 4275 15,813,225 15,813,225 
Node 
11 
4 50% 
72 
- 
ethylene 154 2663 29,545,763 
49,267,763 72 Monoethylene Glycol 66 2000 9,450,000 
72 Diethylene Glycol 71 2000 10,272,000 
Node 6 4 50% 
72 
- 
Ammonia 53 1013 3,827,250 
18,877,500 
72 Ethyl hexanol 20 4275 6,027,750 
72 Urea 79 1050 5,985,000 
72 Di-Octyl Phthalate(DOP) 6 6750 3,037,500 
Node 4 4 50% 
72 
3, 5, 12 
Menthol 109 863 6,797,363 
25,015,613 
72 MTBE 112 2250 18,218,250 
Node 3 5 100% 
72 
12 
MTBE 73 2250 11,832,750 
64,543,500 
72 Polypropylene 171 4275 52,710,750 
Node 5 5 100% 
72 
- 
Polyethylene 86 4275 26,355,375 
51,015,375 
72 Ethylene Glycol 171 2000 24,660,000 
Node 
12 
5 
100% 72 
- 
ethylene 80 2663 15,320,025 
20,548,740  
72 Propylene 9 3225 1,983,375 
 
72 LLDPE 103 420 3,107,160 
 
12 LDPE 27 420 138,180 
Node 7 5 100% 
12 
3, 5, 6, 7 
ethylene 228 2663 7,293,919 
19,382,769 12 Propylene 114 3225 4,418,250 
12 Butene 228 2800 7,670,600 
Node 8 5 100% 
12 
3, 5, 6, 7, 
12 
ethylene 114 2663 3,647,625 
4,233,300 12 Sodium Hydroxide 11 1500 205,500 
12 Ethylene Dichloride 23 1388 380,175 
Node 9 5 100% 12 12 fertilizer 542 900 5,850,000 5,850,000 
         
352,423,659 
Table ‎4-22   Loss calculation due to scenario 2. 
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Node 
Name 
Zone Risk Value Hours 
Affected 
Nodes 
Product Ton\Hour Price Loss in SAR 
 
Node 7 3 30% 
168 
3, 5, 6, 
12 
ethylene 228 2663 102,114,863 
271,358,763 168 Propylene 114 3225 61,855,500 
168 Butene 228 2800 107,388,400 
Node 12 3 30% 
168 
- 
ethylene 80 2663 35,746,725 
49,559,160 
168 Propylene 9 3225 4,627,875 
168 LLDPE 103 420 7,250,040 
168 LDPE 27 420 1,934,520 
Node 5 4 50% 
168 
 
Polyethylene 86 4275 61,495,875 
119,035,875 
168 Ethylene Glycol 171 2000 57,540,000 
Node 6 5 100% 
168 
- 
Ammonia 53 1013 8,930,250 
44,047,500 
168 Ethyl hexanol 20 4275 14,064,750 
168 Urea 79 1050 13,965,000 
168 Di-Octyl Phthalate(DOP) 6 6750 7,087,500 
Node 3 5 100% 
168 
12 
MTBE 73 2250 27,609,750 
150,601,500 
168 Polypropylene 171 4275 122,991,750 
Node 4 4 50% 
72 
3, 5, 12 
Menthol 109 863 6,797,363 
25,015,613 
72 MTBE 112 2250 18,218,250 
Node 8 4 50% 
72 
3, 5, 6, 
7, 12 
ethylene 114 2663 21,885,750 
25,399,800 72 Sodium Hydroxide 11 1500 1,233,000 
72 Ethylene Dichloride 23 1388 2,281,050 
Node 11 4 50% 
72 
- 
ethylene 154 2663 29,545,763 
49,267,763 72 Monoethylene Glycol 66 2000 9,450,000 
72 Diethylene Glycol 71 2000 10,272,000 
Node 1 5 100% 
12 
- 
Methanol 114 863 1,181,625 
1,681,313 
12 Butanediol 9 4875 499,688 
Node 2 5 100% 12 - Polypropylene 51 4275 2,635,538 2,635,538 
Node 9 5 100% 12 12 fertilizer 542 900 5,850,000 5,850,000 
Node 10 5 100% 12 - Methanol 375 863 3,881,250 3,881,250 
       
  
748,334,073 
Table ‎4-23   Loss calculation due to scenario 3. 
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4.9 Resources Allocation to Reduce the Overall Risk 
After identifying and prioritizing all the critical locations at CI. Decision maker needs to 
know what is the best way to allocate a available resources to protect CI against 
damage. In this Thesis we proposed a new method to allocate resources which is based 
on reducing the worst damage that can occur or reduce expected damages. This method 
divides all elements at CI are divided according to their criticality. Then empirical values 
are used to disrepute the resources all resources.  
Very Low 
Critical 
Low 
Critical 
Moderate 
Critical 
High 
Critical 
Extreme 
Critical 
Criticality 
5% 10% 20% 25% 40% Allocated Resources 
Table ‎4-24 Resource Allocation Table 
Table 4-24 shows the amount of recourses that will be allocated to harden the critical 
elements. The criticality is explained in Section 4.7. Figure 4.18 and Figure 4-19 show the 
critical elements in both machine failure and terrorist attack failure scenarios 
respectively. That means that the extreme critical elements will get 40% of the available 
resources for protection while very low critical elements will receive only 5%. For 
example, the allocation of SAR 5,000,000 to protect JIC elements against terrorist attack 
will assign SAR 2,000,000, 40% of the total amount, to protect nodes 13 and 14 which 
are the extreme critical node in Figure 4-19. Table 4-25 shows how to allocate SAR 
5,000,000 to reduce the overall risk of all JIC’s nodes. 
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Very Low 
Critical 
Low 
Critical 
Moderate 
Critical 
High Critical 
Extreme 
Critical 
Criticality 
5% 10% 20% 25% 40% 100% 
4 2 3 3 2 No. of Nodes 
Allocating SAR 5,000,000 to reduce the overall risk 
250,000 500,000 1,000,000 1,250,000 2,000,000 Money allocated 
62,500 250,000 333,333 416,667 1,000,000 Money allocated per Node 
Table ‎4-25 Example of resource allocation method  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this Thesis, we discussed a methodology for identifying the critical locations in 
petrochemical industry. This methodology can identify individual critical locations and 
combinations of locations, which when attacked through simultaneous or sequential 
events could lead to significant consequences. All the critical locations are ranked 
according to their potential impact which will be used as the basis of risk informed 
decision making. The PMCS technique is proposed in this thesis as new technique to be 
applicable for homogenous and heterogeneous networks. A new approach, LPLC, was 
presented to provide a ranking mechanism to classify all CIs according to the impacting 
total loss cost.  
This methodology is applied to the petrochemical industries at JIC in Saudi Arabia. All 
the JIC elements are ranked according to their criticality. Six scenarios are tested. Both 
machine failure and terrorist attack are examined in this thesis. 
5.2 Future Work 
This approach could be applied for other types of CIs e.g. oil pipeline, water-supply 
network and power grid network. Also, applying cascade failure that caused by one CI 
and deployed to the other CIs. This work does not take link capacity into account so that 
it would be helpful to include the concept of Input Output Model (IOM). 
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Appendix A 
Survey Instructions 
A. As a Decision Maker in a petrochemical organization/company, you are given a set of 
categories. In each category (i.e., Impact Category), there are many options (i.e., Economic 
vs. Image).  
B. You kindly requested to select one option among these two options (i.e., Image) which you 
believe it is more important to your petrochemical organization/company.  
C. For the selected (i.e., Image), give a scale from 1 to 9 to weight the importance of the selected 
over the other to your petrochemical organization/company.  
D. The scale values are selected according to what is shown below: 
 Scale = 1 for Equally Important Option 
 Scale = 3 for Weakly Important Option 
 Scale = 5 for Moderately Important 
 Scale = 7 Strongly Important 
 Scale = 9 Extremely Important 
 
Impact Categories: 
1. Economic vs. Image     (______) 
2. Economic vs. Health & Safety   (______) 
3. Image vs. Health & Safety    (______) 
4. Environment vs. Economic    (______) 
5. Environment vs. Health & Safety  (______) 
6. Environment vs. Image    (______) 
Economics: 
1. External vs. Own    (______) 
Image: 
1. Public vs. Customer    (______) 
2. Public vs. Workers    (______) 
3. Customers vs. Workers    (______) 
Health & Safety: 
1. General Public vs. Workers   (______) 
2. Long-term Impact vs. Immediate Casualties  (______) 
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Help: 
1. Impact on Health and Safety: Include both temporary and permanent impacts on Health 
and Safety. 
2. Impact on Image: Internal Image within the Administration, Image with the General 
Public, Image with Critical Customers and Image with Individual Customers. 
3. Impact on Economic: Includes Economic Impact on Own Property and Economic Impact 
on Other People's Property. 
4. Impact on Environment: Include all the impacts on the Environment inside and outside 
the organization. 
5. For the background specialization, kindly mention your professional specializations such 
as Engineering, Management, Economic/Finance, Security, etc. 
 
Example: 
Impact Categories 
 
1. Economic vs. Image      (__3__)  Image Impact is Weakly Important than  
                                                                                       Economic Impact 
 
2. Economic vs. Health & Safety    (__9__)   Economic Impact is Extremely  
                                                                                         Important than Health&Safety Impact 
 
3. Image vs. Health & Safety     (__3__)   Health&Safety Impact is Weakly  
                                                                                         Important than Image Impact 
 
4. Environment vs. Economic     (__9__)  Economic Impact is Extremely  
                                                                                       Important than Environment Impact 
 
5. Environment vs. Health & Safety  (__1__)  Health&Safety Impact is Equally    
                                                                                       Important than Environment Impact 
 
6. Environment vs. Image     (__7__)  Image Impact is Strong 
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Appendix B 
Production Minimum Cut Set of petrochemical industry network at JIC: 
Node1 = {Node 1, Node 13, Node 14, e11, e23}; 
Node2 = {Node 2, Node 13, Node 14, e12, e24}; 
Node3 = {Node 3, Node 4, Node 7, Node 8, , Node 13, Node 14, e2, e4, e8, e13, e14, e17, e18, 
e25, e26, e28, e29 ,36}; 
Node4 = {Node4, Node 13, Node 14, e14, e26}; 
 Node5 = {Node 4, Node 5, Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14, e3, e5, e8, e14, e15, e17, e18, 
e26, e28, e29, e35, e36}; 
Node6 = {Node 6, Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14, e6, e8, e16, e17, e18, e27, e28, e29, 
e36}; 
Node7 = {Node 7, Node 8, Node 13, Node 14e, 8, e17, e18, e28, e29, e36}; 
Node8 = {Node8, Node 13, Node 14, e18, e29}; 
Node9 = {Node9, Node 13, Node 14, e19, e30};  
Node10 = {Node10, Node 13, Node 14, e20, e31}; 
Node11 = {Node11, Node 13, Node 14e, 21, e32} 
Node12 = {Node 3, Node 4, Node 7, Node 8, Node 9, Node 12, Node 13, Node 14, e1, e2, e4, e8, 
e10, e13, e14, e17, e18, e19, e22, e25, e26, e28, e29, e30 e33, e34, e36} 
Node 13 = {Node 13}; 
Node 14 = {Node 14}. 
  
108 
 
Appendix C 
Data from Decision Maker 1 (DM1): 
Performance Measures Weights Assessment 
 
Impact  Categories 
  H&S Image Economics Environment 
H&S 1.00 5.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
Image 0.20 1.00 0.1429 0.1111 
Economics 0.50 7.00 1.00 3.0000 
Environment 0.33 9.00 0.33 1.00 
Weights 0.4291 0.0501 0.3184 0.2024 
 
Consistency  index 17.3809 
Consistency  ratio 19.3121 
 
Performance  Measures 
 
Impact on Health and Safety 
 
Workers Public 
Workers 1.00 7.00 
Public 0.14 1.00 
Weights 0.8750 0.1250 
 
 Impact on Image 
  Internal General Public Customers 
Internal 1.00 5.00 2.00 
General Public 0.20 1.00 0.14 
Customers 0.50 7.00 1.00 
Weights 0.5364 0.0800 0.3836 
 
Consistency  index 7.8777 
Consistency  ratio 13.5823 
 
 
  Impact on Economics 
  Own External 
Own 1.00 5.00 
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External 0.50 1.00 
Weights 0.7500 0.2500 
 
Data from Decision Maker 2 (DM2): 
 Impact  Categories 
  H&S Image Economics Environment 
H&S 1.00 0.3333 0.1111 0.3333 
Image 3.00 1.00 0.1667 3.0000 
Economics 9.00 6.00 1.00 7.0000 
Environment 3.00 0.33 0.14 1.00 
Weights 0.0534 0.1750 0.6667 0.1049 
 
Consistency  index 11.0814 
Consistency  ratio 12.3127 
 
Performance  Measures 
 Impact on Health and Safety 
  Long-term Impact Immediate Casualties 
Long-term Impact 1.00 4.00 
Immediate Casualties 0.25 1.00 
Weights 0.8000 0.2000 
 
 Impact on Image 
  Internal General Public Customers 
Internal 1.00 0.33 0.11 
General Public 3.00 1.00 0.13 
Customers 9.00 8.00 1.00 
Weights 0.0675 0.1463 0.7861 
 
Consistency  index 10.7631 
Consistency  ratio 18.5570 
 
  Impact on Economics 
  Own External 
Own 1.00 0.13 
External 8.00 1.00 
Weights 0.1111 0.8889 
 
Data from Decision Maker 3 (DM3): 
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 Impact  Categories 
  H&S Image Economics Environment 
H&S 1.00 0.3333 0.1429 0.2000 
Image 3.00 1.00 0.1429 0.1429 
Economics 7.00 7.00 1.00 1.0000 
Environment 5.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 
Weights 0.0580 0.0940 0.4396 0.4083 
 
Consistency  index 11.0647 
Consistency  ratio 12.2942 
 
Performance  Measures 
 Impact on Health and Safety 
  Long-term Impact Immediate Casualties 
Long-term Impact 1.00 7.00 
Immediate Casualties 0.14 1.00 
Weights 0.8750 0.1250 
 
 Impact on Image 
  Internal General Public Customers 
Internal 1.00 5.00 1.00 
General Public 0.20 1.00 0.14 
Customers 1.00 7.00 1.00 
Weights 0.4353 0.0782 0.4866 
 
Consistency  index 0.8196 
Consistency  ratio 1.4131 
 
  Impact on Economics 
  Own External 
Own 1.00 1.00 
External 1.00 1.00 
Weights 0.5000 0.5000 
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Data from Decision Maker 4 (DM4): 
 Impact  Categories 
  H&S Image Economics Environment 
H&S 1.00 0.3333 3.0000 0.1429 
Image 3.00 1.00 5.0000 0.2000 
Economics 0.33 0.20 1.00 0.1429 
Environment 7.00 5.00 7.00 1.00 
Weights 0.1057 0.2162 0.0547 0.6234 
 
Consistency  index 13.7255 
Consistency  ratio 15.2506 
 
Performance  Measures 
 Impact on Health and Safety 
  Long-term Impact Immediate Casualties 
Long-term Impact 1.00 7.00 
Immediate Casualties 0.14 1.00 
Weights 0.8750 0.1250 
 
 Impact on Image 
  Internal General Public Customers 
Internal 1.00 0.14 2.00 
General Public 7.00 1.00 5.00 
Customers 0.50 0.20 1.00 
Weights 0.1580 0.7311 0.1109 
 
Consistency  index 10.6083 
Consistency  ratio 18.2903 
 
  Impact on Economics 
  Own External 
Own 1.00 7.00 
External 0.14 1.00 
Weights 0.8750 0.1250 
 
Data from Decision Maker 5 (DM5): 
 
 Impact  Categories 
  H&S Image Economics Environment 
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H&S 1.00 5.0000 3.0000 5.0000 
Image 0.20 1.00 0.2000 3.0000 
Economics 0.33 5.00 1.00 5.0000 
Environment 0.20 0.33 0.20 1.00 
Weights 0.5143 0.1158 0.3045 0.0654 
 
Consistency  index 15.3272 
Consistency  ratio 17.0302 
 
Performance  Measures 
 Impact on Health and Safety 
  Long-term Impact Immediate Casualties 
Long-term Impact 1.00 5.00 
Immediate Casualties 0.20 1.00 
Weights 0.8333 0.1667 
 
 Impact on Image 
  Internal General Public Customers 
Internal 1.00 5.00 0.20 
General Public 0.20 1.00 0.11 
Customers 5.00 9.00 1.00 
Weights 0.2157 0.0612 0.7231 
 
Consistency  index 10.1917 
Consistency  ratio 17.5719 
 
  Impact on Economics 
  Own External 
Own 1.00 0.14 
External 7.00 1.00 
Weights 0.1250 0.8750 
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Appendix D 
Scenarios Data: 
Terrorist attack scenarios; 
Scenario 1: 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0.059 0 0 0.45 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0.059 0 0 0.188 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.0444 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.132 0.044 0.044 1 0.044 0.044 0.0444 0.0444 0.044 0.044 
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Weight 
 
 
0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.0374 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.409 0.037 0.037 1 0.037 0.037 0.0374 0.0374 0.037 1 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.1658 0.166 0.391 0.166 0.391 0.391 0.391 1 0.166 0.166 0.1658 0.3905 0.166 1 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.37 0 0.37 0.37 0.37 1 0 0 0 0.3697 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0.37 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
ecosystems 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
0.2842 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Scenario 2: 
reversible 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.0686 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0686 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1881 0 0 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1881 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
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Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 
1.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
1 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 1 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.1318 
Weight 
 
 
0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
1 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 1 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 1 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
1 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 0.3905 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 1 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 1 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
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0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3697 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
ecosystems 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
reversible 
0.2842 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.0686 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
0.2842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2842 0 0 0 0 
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Scenario 3: 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0.0591 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0757 0 0 0 0 0.0757 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 1 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 0.0444 1 0.0444 0.0444 
Weight 
 
 
0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.1658 0.1658 0.3905 0.1658 0.3905 0.3905 1 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 0.1658 1 0.1658 1 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.3697 0 0.3697 0.3697 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0.3697 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
ecosystems 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
reversible 
0.2842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.0686 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0686 0 0 0 0 0.0686 0 0 
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Machine failure scenarios; 
Scenario 1: failure at link “e17” 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 1.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.1318 0 0.1318 0.449 0.449 0 0 0 0 0.1318 0.449 0 
Weight 
 
 0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
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Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.0374 0 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0 0 0 0 0.0374 0.0374 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.3905 0 0.3905 0.3905 1 0 0 0 0 0.3905 0.3905 0 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.1311 0 0.1311 0.3697 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0.1311 0.1311 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
ecosystems 
1.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
reversible 
0.2842 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Minor, short term environmental impact.  0.0686 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
122 
 
 
Scenario 2: Failure at Node 4 and link “e2” 
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0686 0 0 0 0 0 0.0686 0 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 1.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
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0 0 0.1318 0.1318 0.0444 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0444 0.1318 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.0374 0.0374 0.0374 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0374 0.0374 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.3905 1 0.1658 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1658 0.3905 0 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 0.1311 1 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1311 0.1311 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
ecosystems 
1.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Scenario 3: Failure at Node 9 and Node 3 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
reversible 
0.2842 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.0686 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
 
0 0 0.0686 0.2842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0686 0 
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Weight Constructed  Scales For Safety & Health 
 
0.4286 Workers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require treatment, 
some of them hospitalization. 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.0591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0591 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0857 Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
A large  share  of the  served population  
requires  treatment 
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Hundreds of persons require treatment, 
dozens of them hospitalization. 
0.4499 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Dozens of persons require  treatment, 
some of  them hospitalization 
0.1881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 A few persons require light treatment. 0.0591 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 No health  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Image 
 
0.0250 Internal Image 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 
Responsibility  is  taken  away  to  Ministry 
of Interior/political instances 1.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
The Eastern Region Governor tightens 
control over JIC’s operation and requires 
frequent reports. 
0.4490 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
A written  report  is required  by  Eastern 
Region Governor/political  instances  to 
explain  incidents  
0.1318 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Verbal  enquiry  from  Eastern Region 
Governor  
0.0444 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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0.00 No negative  image  0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.1318 0 0 0 0 0 0.1318 0 0 0.0444 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0071 Image  with  the General Public 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 International interest from the media. 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Repeated  appearance  in  the  national  
media appearance  in  the  international  
media. 
0.4092 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  publication  in  the  local media, 
appearance  in  the  national  media 
0.1363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Single appearance  in  the  local media 0.0374 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0.00 
No  negative  image  with the General 
Public 
0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.0374 0 0 0 0 0 0.0374 0 0 0.0374 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.0838 Image with Customers 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Most critical  customers upset 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 
Numerous  letters  from different  
customers 
0.3905 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 
Repeated  verbal communications,  few 
letters 
0.1658 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.00 Few  verbal  communications 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No negative  image 0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.3905 0 0 0 0 0 0.3905 0 0 0.1658 0 0 
  
 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Economic 
0.0381 Economic  Impact on Own  Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
0 0 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0.3697 0 0 0.1311 0 0 
Weight 
 
 
0.2664 
Economic  Impact  on Other People's 
Property 
Level Constructed Scale 
4.00 Dozens of Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.00 Millions  of  Saudi Riyals 0.3697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.00 Hundreds  of  thousands of Saudi Riyals 0.1311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 Dozens of thousands  of Saudi Riyals 0.0441 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No  economic  impact 0.0000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weight Constructed  Scales For Environment 
 
0.0654 Impact on  the Environment 
Level Constructed Scale 
3.00 
Major Environmental  Impact, with  long-
term damage  to large,  valuable  
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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ecosystems 
2.00 
Medium environmental damage, with 
some animals perishing.  Eventually  
reversible 
0.2842 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1.00 
Minor, short term environmental impact.  
No permanent  damage  to  any 
ecosystems 
0.0686 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.00 No environmental  impact 0.0000 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 
0 0 0.2842 0 0 0 0 0 0.2842 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix E 
Performance Index (PI) of PMCS for three scenarios for terrorist attack 
 
sc
en
ar
io
 Decision-Maker 1 Decision-Maker 2 Decision-Maker 3 Decision-Maker 4 Decision-Maker 5 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
PMCS PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI 
Node1 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
Node2 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node3 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
Node4 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
Node5 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node6 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
Node7 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
Node8 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
Node9 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
Node10 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
Node11 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node12 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
Node13 1.1400 0.9250 1.0327 1.3437 1.3114 1.3889 1.2293 1.1562 1.2314 0.8553 1.0497 0.7613 0.9784 0.8894 0.8410 
Node14 1.1557 0.9435 1.0485 1.4832 1.4519 1.5293 1.2745 1.2051 1.2769 1.0275 1.2248 0.9394 1.0551 0.9682 0.9180 
e1 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e2 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e3 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e4 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e5 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e6 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
e8 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
e10 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e11 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
e12 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e13 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e14 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
e15 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e16 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e17 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e18 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
e19 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
e20 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
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e21 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e22 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e23 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
e24 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e25 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e26 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
e27 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e28 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e29 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
e30 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
e31 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
e32 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e33 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e34 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e35 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e36 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
 
Performance Index (PI) of PMCS for three scenarios for machine failure 
  Decision-Maker 1 Decision-Maker 2 Decision-Maker 3 Decision-Maker 4 Decision-Maker 5 
scenario 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
MCS PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI PI 
Node1 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
Node2 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node3 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
Node4 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
Node5 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node6 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
Node7 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
Node8 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
Node9 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
Node10 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
Node11 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
Node12 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
Node13 1.1400 0.9250 1.0327 1.3437 1.3114 1.3889 1.2293 1.1562 1.2314 0.8553 1.0497 0.7613 0.9784 0.8894 0.8410 
Node14 1.1557 0.9435 1.0485 1.4832 1.4519 1.5293 1.2745 1.2051 1.2769 1.0275 1.2248 0.9394 1.0551 0.9682 0.9180 
e1 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e2 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e3 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e4 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
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e5 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e6 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
e8 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
e10 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e11 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
e12 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e13 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e14 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
e15 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e16 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e17 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e18 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
e19 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
e20 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
e21 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e22 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e23 0.0039 0.4152 0.0038 0.0243 0.5039 0.0233 0.0097 0.5165 0.0094 0.0114 0.4534 0.0055 0.0153 0.3237 0.0150 
e24 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e25 0.1907 0.0078 0.4537 0.1652 0.0486 0.5603 0.2024 0.0194 0.5276 0.0690 0.0228 0.3444 0.0963 0.0305 0.3366 
e26 0.4075 0.0156 0.5527 0.5348 0.0972 0.6653 0.5205 0.0387 0.6380 0.3628 0.0456 0.3784 0.3134 0.0610 0.3995 
e27 0.0954 0.0071 0.0952 0.0826 0.0552 0.0816 0.1012 0.0200 0.1009 0.0345 0.0168 0.0286 0.0482 0.0341 0.0479 
e28 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
e29 1.1126 0.0266 1.0064 1.1737 0.1767 1.2256 1.1615 0.0684 1.1656 0.7755 0.0738 0.7228 0.8716 0.1104 0.7361 
e30 0.0993 0.0078 0.3623 0.1069 0.0486 0.5020 0.1109 0.0194 0.4361 0.0459 0.0228 0.3213 0.0634 0.0305 0.3037 
e31 0.0039 0.4636 0.0038 0.0243 0.5094 0.0233 0.0097 0.5230 0.0094 0.0114 0.4654 0.0055 0.0153 0.3790 0.0150 
e32 0.0039 0.0039 0.0038 0.0243 0.0243 0.0233 0.0097 0.0097 0.0094 0.0114 0.0114 0.0055 0.0153 0.0153 0.0150 
e33 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e34 0.0954 0.0039 0.3585 0.0826 0.0243 0.4787 0.1012 0.0097 0.4267 0.0345 0.0114 0.3158 0.0482 0.0153 0.2887 
e35 0.2129 0.0039 0.0952 0.3454 0.0243 0.0816 0.3084 0.0097 0.1009 0.2824 0.0114 0.0286 0.2019 0.0153 0.0479 
e36 0.5943 0.0227 1.0026 0.6757 0.1524 1.2022 0.7133 0.0587 1.1562 0.4203 0.0624 0.7173 0.3945 0.0951 0.7211 
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Appendix F 
 
Petrochemical Prices in US $ (April 11, 2009) 
Ethylene 710 US $\Ton 
Propylene 860 US $\Ton 
Benzene 650 US $\Ton 
Styrene 1000 US $\Ton 
Methanol 230 US $\Ton 
MTBE 600 US $\Ton 
Polyethylene 1140 US $\Ton 
Polypropylene 1140 US $\Ton 
Polystyrnen 1110 US $\Ton 
PVC 690 US $\Ton 
MEG 540 US $\Ton 
PTA 850 US $\Ton 
Urea 280 US $\Ton 
Urea 260 US $\Ton 
Ammonia 270 US $\Ton 
Ammonia 265 US $\Ton 
 
 
